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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
I. THE PROBLEM 
In recent times, ideological issues ~ave come to play 
an ever increasing role in social relations. Under certain 
conditions, ideological issues create conflicts within a 
society. At such times, groups, subgroups, and individuals, 
who are engaged in struggles £or power, tend to use extra-
neous ideological issues rather than organizational e££iciency 
to reach their objectives. The purpose o£ this study was to 
investigate the use o~ the ideological issue o£ Communism in 
labor relations. It will be shown how labor leaders, who 
were engaged in competitive struggles ~or power, may have 
used ideological issues as criteria rather than organizational 
e~ficiency in attempts to gain their objectives. 
The study was not concerned with the "rights" or 
"wrongs" o~ ideological issues, or with the problem o~ whether 
or not the groups and individuals who used ideological issues 
were "sincere". This study was not considered to be the ~inal 
answer to the problem. This approach was but one of many 
possible ways o~ ascertaining the reasons ~or human 
social behavior . Thi s paper wi ll have s er ved its purpo se 
if its c ontent s furnish a st i mulus for furth er r esea rch by 
students of the human society. 
I I. HISTORY OF 'l'HE PROBL hlVI 
2 
S i nce the termination of World War Two, the relations 
between t he United States and the Soviet Union have de ter i o -
rated . In the United States, the public was informed t h a t 
the Sovie t Union and the Communist ideology were external 
fac t ors which constituted a threat to the American socia l 
system. The government and other a g encies charged with t h e 
pro t ec tion of the nat ion too~ certain measures to insure 
its s a fe ty. 
At t h is time, anti-Communist and anti-union asso-
c iations raised alarms and informed the public that within 
the na tion there ex isted a "fifth column" whose members 
were i n positions where they might damag e the national s e -
cur ity . Associations such as the Chamber of Commerce of t he 
United S t a tes (Chamber) and the Social Welfare Conferen c e 
of the Ca t holic Church, as well as some government officials 
informed the public that certain governmental departments 
and a nwnber of Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) 
affi l ia tes were eith er Communist-controlled or under 
Communi s t influence. 
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In t h :ts study, :tt was p lanned to investiga te on e 
function o f the ideolo g ical issue and the effect of its 
u se w:t th special emphasis being g iven to the relationship 
between t he various affiliates within the cro. 
In 1949, during the CIO national convention, an 
ammendment to the constitution empowered the CIO Executive 
Board to remove any member from the Board who was considered 
to be a Communist or under Com~unist influence. The Board 
was also empowered to expel an entire union from the CIO 
for the same reasons . 
The ~leventh CIO Constitutional Convention awarded 
the jurisdiction of the Farm ~quipment and Metal Workers 
(FE ) to the United Automobile Workers ( UAW), revoked 
the charter of the Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers 
(UE), and chartered a new union in the electrical field, 
the Internatio~al ynion of Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers, CIO (IUE) . 
According to the press, the l"ecord in the convention pl'o-
c ,3edings , and statements of some CIO leaders, the action 
taken against the UE was the first of a series of actions 
d esign ed to remove leaders of CIO unions who were in 
symp athy with or subscribed to the Communlst ideology . 
After the convention action, major changes occurr ed 
1 The CIO \'Vh.at It Is and '\rVha t It Does, CIO publica-
tion No . 173,""'"4th Printing, May,~O-,-p-:-IT. 
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in the l ea d ership and in the order of rel ationships in t he 
CI O. Cha nges als o occurred in t he CIO organizat ional struc-
t ur e . A new group ass"t.Lme d positions of leadershi p and new 
policies were introduced . The action of the CIO app eared to 
con form to d emands or pressures whic:-1 existed in the external 
situation . 
A CIO publication 2 stated the CI O's international 
polic y, which included suppor t of the United Nat ions (UN), 
the International Labor Organi zations (ILO), the .ii.'uropean 
Recovery Program {ERP ), and the North Atlantic Pact ( NATO). 
It is assumed ~hat this policy was supported by a majority 
within the CIO, although a minority may have opposed the 
policy . It appears that the foreign pol i cy o f the CIO wa s 
in harmony with the bipartisan formulated forei gn policy 
of the government. 
Attac k s upon the CIO, on i deological issues, have 
b een made frequently since 1935 by organizations and asso-
ciations exter nal t o t he OIO . However, up to 1949, unions 
were not expelled fr om the CIO on ideological charges and no 
changes in the CIO constitution were proposed, as a result 
of t h ese external at tacks . In 1949, the chang es to the CIO 
constitution and the subsequent expulsions were actions 
2 Ibid., pp . 8 f. 
-- . 
:lntttated and executed by union leaders within the CIO . · rt 
appears from this act.ion that a faction within the CIO may 
have used the external situation to chang e the ord.er o f re-
lationships between the unions . This action resulted in 
changes which affected the relative power of individuals 
within the CIO ~ I f the unions and the leaders were guilty 
of the Comnunist charges, if they wer e as dangerous to the 
nation's safety, as they were portrayed to be , then, the 
situation appeared to have been a matter for the legal 
authoriti es to act upon rather than a group of CIO labor 
leaders .. Since the CIO had no specific rules before 1949. 
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The U.i:!: leaders were not convicted of being Communists 
o r of participating in activities which were consid ered sub -
versive. They were not denied the legitimacy to act as repre-
~entatives of a labor union . The CIO did not directly accus e t he UE 
tQp .o,fficials . . of being Communists. 3 They were assumed to 
be pro~CommQnist because they failed to approve some of the 
government policies which the CIO had approved .. 
The f act that the CIO chartere d a new union, the IU~, 
to replac e the ousted UE may be an indication that one 
.faction of the CIO leadership had suf.ficient power to oust 
the UE l eaders and the union from the CIO on the i d eologi -
cal charges , but were unable to oust the UE leaders .from the 
UJ£ on the same charges. Th e UE is still operating, being the 
3 CIO Convention Proceedin~s, 19L~ , pp . 265 ff . 
bargaining agent for approximately 310,000 workers in 
1020 shops, 4 which indicates that the union's legitimacy 
was not denied by the legal authorities. 
A labor union is primarily an association of v1orkers 
whose elected officials are empowered by the members to make 
contracts with employers concerning conditions upon which 
labor will be performed. Neither the CIO, nor the minority 
within the UE, charged the UE leaders with organizational 
inefficiency. The charges ;Of Communi~m against the UE leaders 
were not given to the courts for decision. These fact indicate 
that the ideological issue may have been used by one faction 
as a means to gain their objectivet.J in a struggle for power. 
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II defines and describes ideologies and power 
and explains their use in relation to the problem. 
Chapter III introduces the factors that existed in 
the external situation and shows how the various groups 
attempted to adapt to these factors. Section I explains 
the povrer structure of the CIO - Democratic Party coalition. 
Section II shows the relationship between Organized Labor, 
the Government, and Industry. Section III shows the 
4 UE Convention Reports, 1951, p. 32. 
6 
or gani zational structure , the operation, and the objectives 
of the Chamber. Section IV explains some aspects of the 
orgeni zet1onal structur e , operation, and obj e ctives of the 
CathoD.c Church in the social action area. This s e ction was 
included for purposes of comp arison because both the Chamber 
and the Church used the same ideological issue against the 
same groups, but the two organizations h ave opposing views 
and s eek different objectives in labor relations. 
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Chapter IV presents the relationships between the 
vari ous affiliates in the CIO and shows how the u s e of ideo-
logical issues may have chan ged the order of relationships 
within the CIO or ganizational structure. Section I give s a 
bri e f description of the CIO or ganizational itructure , shows 
how the or gani zation operates, and indicates the relative 
posit i ons of power. Section II describes a nd an alyzes the 
relationships between the UE , the CIO, and other CIO affili-
ates and shows the relationship between sub-groups in the UE . 
Chapter V cons i sts of the general findin gs and con-
clusi ons which may be drawn from the the oretic al a_nd em-
piric el date .• 
IV. SOURCES OF I NFORMATION 
The material presented in the paper was obtained 
from s e veral sources. The sociological data were obtained 
mainly from sociological textbooks, and classes end semi-
nars on Social Theories, Social Philosophy, Social Psy-
chology , Human Relations, Industrial Relations, Labor 
Relations and Labor Economics, and Labor Programs and 
Labor Ideologies. The main sources of information for the 
empirical data were the writer's personal experiences which 
extend e d over a period of twenty-five years es a member 
of labor unions and as a supervisor and employer of union 
workers. Specific information relating to particular groups 
in the study was obtained from personal interviews with 
labor leaders, union files, correspondence, pamphlets, 
books, magazine articles, publications of learned organl-
zatlons, labor publications, National Encyclopedia articles, 
Year Books, World Almanacs, and Newspapers. 
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CHAPTER II 
IDEOLOGIES AND l:" POWER 
In recent times, ·c:Onflicts between groups and individ-
uals in our society have increased as a result of an ideolo-
gical issue which has emerged from the conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. An ideological issue exists 
when a group is confronted with diver gent ideologies and is 
forced to take action. The ideological issue arising from the 
problem of Communism has played an important role in practically 
all areas of. social relationships within the American society. 
Ideological issues have their genesis in the ideologies of 
social movements. 
The ideology of a social movement may be thought of 
as providing a movement with its philosophy and its psy-
chology. It gives it _a -~ set of values, a set of convictions, 
a set of criticisms, a set of arguments and a set of de-
fense s . As such it furnishes to a movement (a) direction 
(b) justification (c) weapons of attack (d) weapons of 
defense and (e) inspiration and hope. To be effective the 
ideology must carry respectability and prestige •••• 
Character is furnished by the intelligentsia of the move-
ment. More important ••• is the need of the ideology to 
answer to the distress, wishes and hopes of the people. 1 
Ideologies and ideological issues are effective as 
weapons in power struggles because generally they cannot be 
verified as they "consis t of a body of doctrine and a set of 
l Alfred M. Lee, et . al., New Outline of The Principles 
~f Sociology, p. 211. 
beliefs and myths." 2 Ideologies, so defined, may be con-
sidered judgments based on a particular set of cultural 
values. 
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Williams 3 states that culture includes among other 
thj_ngs, a system of goals and values. Certain goals are 
emphasized as worth striving for, while others are considered 
evil or detrimental. The culture also provides the means 
for obtaining the desired goals, and provides the punishment 
and penalties for the violation of the prescribed rules. 
A culture may include a complex set of beliefs about 
man, his nature and rights, and about the universe and its 
relation to man. Such beliefs generally involve (a) valua-
tional elements (the good-bad, desirable-undesirable), {b) 
prescriptive elements (how one should act, think, feel), and 
(c) cognitive elements (what exists, what entities, sequen-
ces, causes and consequences). Cognitive beliefs can be 
divided into three main categories {a) those subject to 
scientific tests and refutable by such tests, (b) those 
outside the domain of empirical verification (the existence 
of heaven and hell, the superiority of American society to 
others), and (c) verified scientific knowledge, kinds of em-
pirical data that fall short of "perfect" scientific certainty. 
2 Ibid., p. 210. 
3 Robin M. Williams, American Society .A Sociological 
Interpretation, pp. 1 ff. 
Cultural norms are appealed to as the source of 
authority and legitimacy for activities in many spheres of 
social activity. Sometimes these norms are claimed as divine 
revelations, the wisdom of ancestors (tradition), ideas of 
natural laws (supply and demand as a regulatory law in eco-
nomics), or as inherent rights ( the Constitution, the Bill 
of Rights, free enterprise). Often the authority of a norm 
is based on its widespread practice. 4 
In this paper, groups which adhere to the existing 
cultural value system and embrace the ideologies of the 
system will be considered the in-group. The in-group's rela-
tions with other groups are determined as friendly or hostile 
according to the ideological concepts of the other groups. 
Groups with divergent ideologies are comsidered the out-group 
by the in-group, which generally regards the out-group as un-
scrupulous. The out-group is felt to be attacking the values 
whi~h the in-group holds dear. The in-group not only feels 
that it is right and correct, but believes it has a common 
responsibility to defend and preserve the values it holds 
dear. 5 
4 Ibid., pp. 23 ff. 
5 Lee, QE• cit., pp. 206-207. 
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When or ganized groups or individuals see k the sup-
port of the public, the introduction of an ideological issue 
a ppears to be a powerful means for receiving such support. 
This may be due to the char acteristic features of the 1~public 1~ . 
The ttpublic 1;1! , unlike a population such e s th s t of the 
Dnited S tates, is like a crowd that lacks organiz a tion and 
unt ty of purpose. In this naper 
The t e Pm '·~pub 1 i c n i s u sed t o refer t o a g r ou p of 
people (a) who are confronted by an issue, (b) who are 
d ivided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, a nd 
(c) who engage in discussion over the issue . The 
existence of an issue means the group hes to act; yet 
there are no understanding definbtions or rules prescrib-
ing what that action should be. 
The agitators or propagandists attempt to convince the 
n: public 1~ in order to gain s uppo1•t for their causes. The above 
statements are important to remember when the empirical dat a 
is presented . Such a 1'publicn existed within the CIO and 
therefore the ideological issue was effective as a means in 
accomp lishing the change in the order of relationships within 
the CIO. 
In order to divide a unified group an ' ~ issue'·~ must be 
prese nted. Ideological issues are especially adapted for this 
purpose, since the contents of ideologie s are ge nerally com-
posed of valuational elements outside the domain of empirical 
6 Ibid., pp. 189 f. 
verification or scientific tests. For example, it is ex-
tremely difficult to test the superiority or greater value 
of Christianity over godless aetheism, or the superiority 
of the American society to others. 
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~fuen an ideological issue is presented to the public, 
it has the effect of creating confusion of thoughts, and tends 
to divide the public into leaderless factions. For example, 
Walter Reuther's introduction of the ideological issue of 
Communism into his campaign for the presidency of the United 
Automobile Workers first split the group into factions, and 
later forced the workers to select their leader on a basis of 
loyalty to a set of beliefs, values and myths, proposed by 
one of the contestants. In the past, union lea.ders were theoretically 
selected on a basis of organizational competency. 
If those who use ideological issues to gain the 
support of the public are concerned about the status quo: 
They may win support for their policies by implying 
that the people who have a deep love for country will 
accept the propagandist's jingoistic ideas because of the 
"•threats'' to their secul:'ity as manifest in the policies 
of some "aggressor" nation. 7 
Romans, 8 in his study of human gl:'oup behavior found 
thst appeal to emotions caused the individual's sentiments 
7 W. H. Werkmeister, An Introduction To Critical 
Thinkingp. 82; Newcomb end Hal'tley, et al.,~eadings In 
Social ~sycholo~y, pp. 315 ff., and Chap. XIII. 
8 George c. Romans, The Human Group, pp. 1 ff. 
to rise above loyalties to a group. When the individual's 
beliefs and basic values were threatened, he would shift his 
loyalties from one group to another. 
It is extremely difficult to determine by scientific 
me thods whether the agitators, who present or promote ideolo-
gict'll issues, do so primarily to promote the cause they champion, 
or for altruistic purposes, or for purposes of reaching objec-
tives of self interest. 9 One or all of the above may be 
involved. 
The contents of ideologies are beliefs, values, and 
myths. These exist as objective entities, which the subjects 
accept or reject. Therefore, if the ideology the agitator 
is presenting is accepted by the npublic", the objective 
consequences, being en integrative part of the ideology, 
mu.st follow. However, the adjustment or adaptation of the 
s ystem which followed as a result of the acceptance of the 
ideology, may also have been a necessary condition for the 
fulfilment of the self-interest objectives of the agitator. 
Eowever, "If any given individual can be said to seek his 
own '-~ self interest" , it follows that he can do so only in 
conforming to some de gree to the institutionalized defini-
tions of s e lf-interest". 10 Therefore, it may b~ said that 
the 
9 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 
Chap. I. 
10 Talcott Parsons, Essays In Social Theory Pure and 
Applied, p. 170. 
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objective ~eached by the agitator occur~ed as a naturel con-
sequence of the events. 
Howeve~, if an in-group, out-group relation is formed 
over ideological issues, within a group primarily organized 
as an agency for bargBinin g collectively, then the ideological 
issue rathe~ than the organizational abilities of the le ade~s 
may become the basis for selecting leadership. In such cBses 
the ideological issue may be considered to have been used es 
a means to secu~e the powe~ of public suppo~t to ~each objec-
tives which we~e self-inte~est oriented. 
A self-interest o~iented objective may be e desire fo~ 
success. The Ame~ican c~i terie. of Usuccessn ma.y be broadly 
stated as pe~sonal achievement, powe~, prestige end possess-
ions. 11 The democratic principle of equal opportunity exists 
for all, but the opportunity to reach the desired goals may 
be blocked because the positions denoting '·•successtt a~e limit-
ed and may already be occupied. A conflict pette~n is auto-
matically established in the competition for positions which 
ax•e deemed symbols of success. The competitive struggle begins 
when the actor attempts to car~y out his own will against the 
resistence of other parties. 12 Thus Bnother factor becomes 
11 Williams, op. cit., p. 87. 
12 Max Weber, Theor1 of Social and Economic Organization 
pp. 133 ff. 
apparent, that within the principles of democracy, there 
exists a. dominant class which has within it a tendency 
to establish an oligarchy. 13 The democratic structure is 
pre s e r ved by the principles which protect the ri ghts of 
minorities to express diver gent or dissenting opinions. 
The formation of opposition begins with the leader 
of the minol'i ty group, which dissents from, or disapprove!t 
of, the actions ol' policies of the controlling group. 
Social dissent constitutes a challenge to the authority 
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of the controlling group. Social dissent is a norma.tive 
1.11ri ghttt. Dissent furnishes a basis for the chan ge necessary 
in a dynamic social system. The degree of tolerated dissent 
depends on the basis for the conflict, and the issues involved. 
If the conflict is deep and concel'ns or endangers the b8sic 
norms, then dissent may result in persecutions, such as 
occurred in the religious strugg les in Engle.nd and France, 
or in the civil war in the United States. 
A dissenting group may withdraw or be expelled from a 
lar ger or ganization. Such action may occur when there is a 
strugg le for power among the leaders. In such an event, the 
dissenting or expelled group may be permitted to continue its 
function in the social aggregate, since its conflict may be 
considel'ed an ol' ganizational problem, and not a dysfunctional 
activity directed at the social system. 
13 Robert Michels, Pol itical ~al'ties p. 390. 
The "~right'11 of minorities to attempt to bee ome the 
me jority is a democratic principle. The limitations as to 
objectives and means are prescribed by the social and in -
stitutionalized norms. Minorities, in their attempts to 
acquire power or control, may take advantage of the exi s t-
ence of external factors. If such factors constitute a 
thre a t to the social structure as a whole, minorities and 
indi viduals may attempt to increase their power by pro-
claiming their alliance with the gr ou p s in control. 
A leader competing for control of an organization 
may identify himself with principles which other groups 
are cham pi oni ng , and thel~eby increase his power and pre -
sti ge. Su ch activity is particularly effective if the 
principles involved are concerned with the preservation of 
cherished norms, princi p les, or values. 
When the society as a whole is threatened b y some 
external factor, the permissive zone of variation from the 
established norms, is narrowed in order to insure control, 
and a greater de gree of cooperation. At such times of ten-
sion, a mild form of individual anomie is produced in the 
form of anxiety over conflicting loyalties. Taking adven -
17 
tage of the vacillating tendencies, the leader may influence 
the masses to make a selection. In this way, the leader may 
re a ch his objective. 
Mental ability , lung p ower, and dema g oguery are all 
qualities on which one leader wins over ano ther. In the 
18 
strugg le among leaders, loftier motives are appealed to. 
The leader, by presenting himself as the protector of the 
b a sic values which the masses cherish, may be selected 
rt. on the grounds th a t it is necessary to sust a;tn the moral 
and theoretical level of the organization. " 14 
Thus, human a ction may consciously be aimed at altering cer-
tain soci a l relationships, or be directed to the prevention 
of their development or continuance. In his quest for power, 
the leader for ces the group to which he appea ls to make a 
se lee ti on, and all stru gg les for p ower in the long run end 
in a selection of those who pos sess the personal qu a lities 
i mp ortant to success. 15 The strugg le for power is a pro-
cess, a means for ob taining desired ends or g oals which are 
in the possessions of others. The action of the conflict, 
the choice of one leader over another , simply indicates that 
one course of a ction h a s been disp laced by another, and as a 
result, the order of relationships within the social struc-
ture h a s changed. 
In the chapter which follows it will be shown how an 
ideologic a l issue, existing in the relationship between the 
United S tates a nd the S oviet Union, affected the relation-
ships between groups an d within sub-groups, in the Uni ted 
S t a te s . The empirical data will point out how ideological 
issu es rather than or g anizational efficiency may have been 
used by le aders who engaged in c ompe ti tt on for p ower. 
14 Loc. cit. 
15 Weber, op. cit., p . 133. 
CHAPTER III 
FACTORS IN Ttill EXTERNAL SITUATI ON AFFECTI NG TH~ CIO 
I • THE COMMUNIST I SSUE AND ITS EFFECT ON 
THE CIO - D~1 0CRATIC PARTY RELATIONSHIP 
From its inception, the CIO allied itself with the 
Democra tic Party. Working in co-operation, both organiza-
tions became strengthened, increased their power, and were 
able to obtain their respective objectives. The Democratic 
Party continued as the majority party with the ensuing 
privileges. The CIO obtained the objectives it sought in 
management-labor relations. The Democratic Party 's New 
Deal proponents, and the CIO opposed the nla.issez faire'·' 
theory in government. Both favored greater ps.rticipation 
of government in the re gulation of management-labor rela-
t ions. 
The depression of the thirties and the failure of 
management to re gain economic equilibrium created a situa-
t ion which gave the New Deal-CIO program the public support 
it needed. Elected to power , the New Deal had to succeed in 
s pi te of the opposition of the Republic an Party and the pro-
ponents of "laissez faireu. 
First, the New Deal attempted to regain economic 
stability through the business and industrial structure. 
Existing laws nullified many of the g overnment's attempts to 
regulB.te the ec anomy . Management in general wes hostile 
to eny changes in managerial prerogatives. The New De al 
the n focussed its a ttention on soci al security and l abor 
relat ions. A s eries of acts desi gned to est ablish ce r tain 
mri ght s 0 of labor were introdu ced in t o the Congress and 
be c ame laws. The Wagner Act aided the CIO in its attempts 
to or ganize the mass production industries. These laws 
made it compulsor y for management to bargain and refrein 
from interfering in union activit y . The CIO as a new labor 
or gani zation formed its or ganizational policies around the 
g overnment regulations. The CIO depended on the governme nt 
and the laws for the protection of the workers' 0 ri ghts 0 • 
Differing from the AFL , the CIO was an active par-
t i ci pant in the politic al field. The CI O's polic y was 
s tated b y John L. Lewis when he wrote: 
11Wi th the guarantee of the right to organize, in-
dustries may be or ganiz ed, but on the other hand, 
bet t er living standards, shorter working hours and i m-
proved employment condi t ions for their (union) members 
c annot be hoped for unless legislation or other pro-
vi s ions be made for econ omic planning end for price, 
production, and profit controls. Be cause of these 
fund ame n t a l conditions, it is obvious to industr i al 
wor k er s tha.t the labor movement mu s t or ganize and 
exert itself not only in the economic field, but a lso 
i n the poli tical aren a . " 1 
Af ter the economy became stabilized, opposition to 
the New Deal-CIO coalit i on and i ts policie s incre a sed. The 
CIO , i n order to ke ep it s i ncr eas e d p ower and · advan t P- ge in 
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its neg ot i ations with management, which it had gained thr ou gh 
1 Foster Rhea Dulles, LA BOR IN ft]'lERI CA p . 313. 
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government protection, increased its political activity. The 
CIO, to insure the gains tha t it had won, de pe nded on a 
g overnment that was friendly towards organized labor. Govern-
me n t intervent ion in management-labor relations gave to or-
ga nized labor more freedom end privileges tha n labor had been 
able to ob t ain over a long period of time. I n retur n , t he 
CIO , in part , los t its politi cal autonomy. 
Until the end of World Wal:' Two , the Dem ocratic Party-
CIO coalition continued to increase its power. As the union 
membership increased, the power of the CIO increased. During 
the depression and the war ye~trs, the Republican Party could 
offer but token resistance to the CIO-Democratic Party coali-
tion's political power, which continued to concentrate more 
power , by the pr ocess of centralizing authority, within the 
government structu:re. Associations and institutions opp osed 
t o a nd affected by this process of the centralization of 
p ower became epprehensi ve concern·ing the potentialities of 
the growing p ower of or ganized labor. The Republican Party, 
the Chamber of Commerce, the NAM, 2 the · U Di:X:i.ecrats~l ', a:t1d , 
ot her an ti-union and anti-Communist associ at ions l'aised 
alarms ove r the possible consolidation of org8nized labor 
i n to a political bloc or third party. 
2 LaFollette Committee Hearings, Anti-Union ctivities, 
pBl:>ts 7-8, 52-53, 56-58 . u . S . Government Printing Office, 
1937-1941; Wilbert E . Moore, I ndustrial Relati ons arid The 
Soci al Order, Chap. XIX. 
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Much literature was distributed wa.rning the public 
about this concentration of power. The accusation of 
Co~~unism was used against the CIO by some organizations, 
notably the N~~ . 3 However , it was not until after the death 
of President Roosevelt, the cessation of hostilities of 
World War Two, and the subsequent deteriorating relat i ons 
be tween the Soviet Un ion and the United States, th a. t I? con-
di ti on wa.s created which furnished the anti-uni on and anti-
Co~nunist forces with a common objective, which permitted a 
united effort aga.inst the power of the CIO and the Democratic 
Administra.tion . As will be noted elsewhere in this pa.per, a 
crmpai g n oriented toward alerting public opinion against the 
threatening da.n ger . of Communism within the g overnment a.nd the 
CI O was used. The 1946 st ate elections and national con-
gressional elections, may h2ve served as political barometers . 
The Democratic Party lost its congressional majority. The 
solidarit 'y of t he power bloc was cracked. The Cor.nnunist 
i s sue appe ared to h eve been an effectiye campaign weapon 
when used simultaneously by sever a l associe.tions of national 
imp ortance. The Administretion no longer enjoyed a majority 
in congress, and was forced to take measures to avoid being 
considered guilty of permitting Communist infiltration, or 
of being sympathetic toward Communism. Loyalty investi ga tions . 
3 Join The CI O ~nd Help Build A Soviet America , 1937, 
N.tLT\fl pamphlet. 
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followed end some individuals, who were considered sec urity 
risks, were transferred or dismissed. Simultaneously, with 
the campai gn s.gainst the Administration, there w~s a simila:r 
campai gn di:rect ed against the CIO. The char ge s were tha t the 
CIO was Communist-cont:rolled and that positions of leadership 
within the organization were held by Communists. 
The external situation, both forei gn and domestic, 
had forced the Admin i st:ration to form a bipartisan foreign 
policy. This policy included the Ma:rshall Plan and the 
Atlantic Pact. It will be shown late:r that support of the 
Administration's bipartisan policy became a majo:r issue 
w:l.thin the CIO. The Administration demanded that the CIO 
have their delegates to the World Federation of T:rade 
Unionis ts make an attempt to h ave the WFTU accept the 
Marshall P lan, which the WFTU had opposed. A group of union 
leaders within the CIO opposed the Administration's request 
and also its fo:rei gn policy. These unions had also opposed 
some of the domestic policies of the Truman administration 
which they considered as anti-union. In addition, these 
unions also supported Henry Wallace for president on the 
P:rogressive Pa:rty ticket in 1948. Another g:roup within the 
CIO supp orted the administ:ration. 
The fact that the CIO, until 1949, continued its 
affiliation with the WF~J, which was considered under 
Communist control, and the fact that one faction openly 
supported the Progressive Party, which was also gene:rally 
de n ou n c e d as Commu nist-controlled, furnished the a.nti-
union and anti-Communist groups with evidence to publicly 
inti r:w te tha t one faction of the CIO was pro-Communist. 
Government offici als, such a s Secret a ry of Labor = Tobin, 
d e nounced the " left-win g t~ unions and in p articular the TJE , f! S 
being Communist controlled, and therefore, dangerous to the 
n a t i on's s e.fe t ~r . 4 Government a gencies, such as the Atomic 
Ener g y Cm.1mission, asked the Gener a l Electric Comp an y and 
ot h e r i ndustries, under contrect to the g overnment, to ce a se 
bar g ai ning with the " left-wing" unions, notab l y the UE . 5 
The pressur e created b y the publicity directed a g ai nst 
the CIO may have forced the internal issue within the CIO to 
a climax. The expulsions of the ttr left-wing u unions, and the 
sub s e qu ent wi thdr Bw al of the CIO from the WFTU , ap peared to 
confirm the char ges made a gainst the CI O by the anti-un i on 
and ~mti -Communist forces, and made the public more sus pi-
ciou s of the Administration and the CI O. 
The fact that the uri ght-wingn -controlled CI O or g an-
ize d a rival to the WF~T, the Internation a l Confederation 
L~ S t e tements before Subcommittee on Lab or and Labor 
1'I enag ement Relations, ·March 19 , 1952. Speech at I UE -CIO 
Convention, Buffalo, N. Y., Sept. 20, 1951, Boston Evening 
Globe. 
5 L. R. Boulware, Communism In Unions, G. E . pub., 
Mar ch 21, 1952, p. 11. 
of Free Trade Unions, which accepted the Marshall Plan , 6 
may be considered as an adap tive measure on the part of 
the CIO , to insure its friendly relationship with the 
Democratic Administration, and ~rove its patrioti s m to the 
public. 
The linking of the CIO and the Administration with 
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Communism at a time when the tension between this nation and 
the Sovi et Uni on was being widely publicised, made e char g e 
of Communism against any group, a powerful weapon. The inter-
national situation furnished the condi~ion necessary to start 
a chain reBction which e ventu a lly broke the power of the 
Democratic Party-CIO conlition. The meny public ations and 
articles on the Communist issue that were distributed at 
that time, hed the effect of campai g n propaga_nda a g ainst the 
Democratic Administration. 
The Communist issue wa.s a powerful means for obtain-
in g the ob jec ti ves sou ght by the var:i. ou s anti-union and anti-
Co~munist forces. The election of the 80th con gres s demon-
stret e d that la.bor programs legi sla.ted into laws can be 
nullified by the same means. 
In the next section, the effect of the CIO-Democratic 
coalition on the relationship between organi zed labor, the 
g overnment, and the CIO will be shown. 
6 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weap on, pp . 
15~.-162. 
II. RELATIONS BETWEEN ORGANIZED 
LABOR , GOVERNMT~~NT, . ND I NDUSTRY 
Whlle the g overnment is prlmar i ly voted into power 
on the assump tion thet lt will serve all the people, it is 
a fact that: 
Back of the formal structure of the state is always 
Bn informe.l pattern of operating practices and rela-
tionships, which may or may not correspond to the 
official pattern. Be.ck of the operating g overnment 
are the groups a.nd intet•ests thet supply the dynamic 
element in politics. 7 
During the World War Two period, labor was repre-
sented on wat•time Government Boards where decisions 
affecting labor and production were made. Representa-
tives of organized labor served side by side with the 
representa.tives of industry on the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Board, the Labor-Manag ement Policy Committee, and 
the National War J-'abor Board. Labor leaders also served 
on many other lesser boards throu ghout the nation. 
The coal strikes in 1943 were the only s er ious ac-
tions egainst the government on the labor front, during the 
war . In effect, these 0 strikes constituted a challenge to 
the g overnment's wag e policy and to the authority of the 
War Labor Boat•d't . 8 A series of restrictive labor bills 
were introduced in Congress. The Smith-Connally Bi ll, 
7 Robin M. Williams, The American S ociety, p. 206. 
8 Dulles, op. cit., p. 338. 
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which became law, was the most important. It provided 
s t Rtu tory authority for the War Labor Board and empowered 
the "President to take control of any plants where disputes 
threatened the wa.r effort, and the national security. On e 
of the bill's provisions prohibited a ll union contrtbutions 
to political campai gn funds. This was a rider aimed at the 
CIO which had contributed funds for the election of Demo-
cratio candidates. t•rndividue.l unions contributed some 
~770,000 to the Democratic campaign of 1936, and lar ge 
sums were contributed also in 1940°. 9 As a result of the 
Smith-Connally law, the CIO created its Political Action 
Committee (PAC). 
The war years brou ght to the forefront the ever in-
creas ing role that the g overnment was playing in industrial 
relations . Roosevelt's wa.r on the 11Economic Royalistsn in 
the thirties had made the industrialists his enemies. 
Roosevelt and the Democratic Party depended on the support 
of labor, especially the support of the two maj or labor 
union federations with their fifteen million members. On 
the other hand, organized labor was awe.re that a. Ufriendly1~ 
government was of utmost imp ortance to it, since laws en-
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ac te d by the g overnment constitute the hi ghest authority by 
whj_ch labor and industry must abide. It is necessary to have 
reasonable, stable laws, which will be enforced in a soci a l 
9 Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labo~ Economics and Labor 
Relations , p . 122. 
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order where agreements between parties are made on a contrac-
tual basis, because without a reasonable guarantee that con-
tractual agreements will be enforced, such a society could 
not fi1nction. Which major political party h as the majority 
of votes in Congress is therefore of prime importance to 
both labor and industry, as the rules and regulations 
affecting their operational policies are enacted by the 
le gislative branch of the g overnment . The government he.s 
bee orne an arbi tr at or, interpreter, a.nd enactor of the la.ws, 
rules, and regulations affecting industry end labor relations. 
During the wal' yea1•s, it was shown that government, 
management, and lsbor could coordinate their efforts and 
ne gotiate their differences on a basis of anta gonistic co-
oper a tion. The government adapted its formal structure to 
the extent that labor relations and labor problems were ex-
pedited through government agencies. Organized labor gained 
its objectives because it supported and co-operated with the 
Democratic Administration. 
The power of organized labor is an unknown qua.ntity. 
~t times this power has been successfully used by labor to 
force acceptance of its demands. Labor leaders use the po-
tential power of their unions as a coercive weapon against 
politicians, and management. The strike is a power weapon . 
Support or opposition to political candidates is a power 
we e.pon. Government and man agement both realize the exis-
tence of this power. However, the liberal Democratic 
govel'nment was a useful tool to le_bor. Close co-operation 
between labor and the Democratic Administration increased 
the power of both, while man agement found itself excluded 
and on the defensive. 
The international situation was an external factor, 
cre et ing a condition which offered an opportunity for anti-
union and anti-Communist organizations to inform the public 
of the dangers of, Communist infiltration in Government and 
labor or ganizations. As e. result, pressure was brought to 
bear on the Administration. Changes in the voting habits 
of the population were sufficiently large to appreciably 
weaken the power of the Administration in Congress, and 
simult a.neously, also weaken the numerical strength and 
power of the labor organization most closely allied with 
the Administration, the CIO. 
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The actions of both labor and management were oriented 
towe1•d gaining control of the le gislative branch of the 
government, because this would mean control over legislation 
affecting the relations between the two groups. 
The next two sections will describe the means used, 
ob jec t j_ ves sou ght, and effects obtai ned by two public 
opinion groups, the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States and the Catholic Church. 
III. THE U11J:TED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
The United States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), a fed-
eration of local and state chambers, has grown in size and 
imp ortance , since its inception. In 1946, there were more 
then 3,100 chambers of commerce and trade organizations 
affiliated with the national chamber. These various cham-
bers and associations had an underlying membership of more 
than 1,250 ,000 business men and over 18 ,000 firms and cor-
porstions. lO 
The Chamber operates as a liason between the member-
ship and the g overnment administration. The chief concern 
of the Che_mber is the continued progress of business end 
the perpetuation of the Americen free enterprise s ystem . 
The Chamber of CoJ11.merce of the United States of 
.!lmerica is wholeheartedly committed to private ent erprise 
in preference to g overnment enterprise, to free enter-
prise in preference to controlled enterprise, e nd to 
competition in preference to monopolistic enterprise. 11 
The Chamber from the beginning was opposed to the New 
Deal policies. These polici e s were advantag eous to organized 
labor. Or g anized le_bor in turn g e_ve actlve support to the 
Democr a tic P 2rty . This fact made the Chember more closely 
allied with the opposition, or Repub lic an :Party . The Chamber 
10 l.l<u . s . Chamber of Commerce't Nat . Encycl . Yr. Books, 
1946-51. 
ll Policy Declara_tion of the U . S . Chember of Com_-rnerce , 
Washington, D. c., July 1949, p . 1 . 
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needed le gislators in Congress who could present and support 
its policies. The Republican Party as the minority party, 
needed public support to become the majority party. 
Since 1946, the Chamber has been using different means 
in a n attemp t to gain its objectives. The Chamber has alerted 
the citizens to the danger of the infiltration of Communists 
in the government and the labor movement. The Chamber initi-
ated a progr am of public information reaching millions of 
citizens. 
A series of publications reporting the finding s of the 
Ch amber's research department were widely distributed. These 
re po:r•ts were unique in that they were not accusative in their 
content matter, but merely explanatory or advisory. The y 
suggested possible courses of action. The first of these 
re ports, issued in 1946, we_s entitled Communist Infiltre.tion 
in the United States. This pamphlet describes how Communists 
infiltrate respectable organizations and use them as ' ·fronts w 
throu gh which Communist propaganda is disseminated. The pam-
phlet, among other things, informed the reader thet news-
papers or magazines which, since 194L~ , had advocated a for-
ei gn polic y similar to that of the Communist press could be 
cons1.dered as controlled by Communists. The Nation, The New 
Republic, and P . M. were singled out as examples of 111Reel 1ll -
dominated publications. These publications are pro-labor, 
pro-Democrat, anti-Republican and generally opposed to the 
bas ic values inherent in the Chamber's policies. 
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The next publication by the Cha~ber's Committee on 
S ocialism and Communism, entitled Communists Within the 
Government , emphasized three major points. First, the 
Communists in our midst have a unique loyalty to the Soviet 
Union. Second, the Communists and the ir followers hBve 
ac h i e ve d positions in the g overnment where they can do harm 
to the national welfare and security. Third, the g overnme n t 
has shown appalling laxity in meeting the problem. Appendix 
v. in this pamphlet is entitled The United Public Workers of 
America, CIO . This union is chal:' ged by sever a l sources of 
be in g Communist-contl:'olled. It is charged that throu gh this 
union it is possible for Communists to enter t he employ of 
the g overnment. The Chamber implied that the g overnment wa.s 
doing nothing about the fact that this union had been accused 
of being a t~Red 1Ti union. The Chamber implied that the Admi n i-
stl:'at i on was unab le or unwilling to contl:'ol the CIO and do 
a n y t hing about the alleged Communist inflltl:'ation in the 
gover nment, because many important posts in the administra-
tion were controlled and occupied by Communists. 
Simultaneously with the publication noted a bove, there 
a ppe ar-e d an other Chamber pamphlet titled, C om:rruni s t s Within 
the Labor Movement. It was purported to be a g ener a l trea t ise 
on t h e matter of Communism i n the ls.bor movement as a whole, 
but wa.s in re a lity directed a t the CI o. Although the Chamber 
ment ioned the fact tha t some loc a ls of the P~L were Communist-
controlled, the Chamber claimed thHt: 
In the AFL, pressure from the top , combined with 
trained and conservative unionism on the part of the 
r ank an d file, h a s tended to keep out Communist in-
flltratlon ••• By contrast the CI O has sh own gre a t 
weakness in fi ghtin g Communist inroads. 12 
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According _to the Chamber, in Communist plans for seiz-
ing power, a primary emphasis is placed on infiltr a tion of 
the 111heavy and strategic industriestt such as the electrical 
e nd atomic ener g y industries. The Chamber publications re-
ferred the re ader to other publications where specific unions 
were named. However, the Cha"nber n&tled the industries, where 
the UE was the bar g aining agent. The Chamber maint ained t hat 
ncommunlsm was strong ly entrenched in the United Electrical 
VIJ' or kers't . 13 In the publicity g iven to the Communts t issue 
as a threat to the nation, the Chamber did not inform the 
public of its own g oals or objectives concerning relations 
b etwe en management, g overnment s nd labor . 
The Chamber's interest in, and publicati on of, the 
Communist threat to the nation may h ave served the Chrunber 
as a means whereby the Cha."!lber was able to gain some of the 
objectives for which it wa s primarily organized, but h a d 
been u nable to re a ch by other means and methods. Publicity 
was directed at the Democratic Administration for its laxity 
12 Communists Wi thin the Labor Movement, 19It-7, p . 8. 
13 Ibid., p. 54. 
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in pe~mitting Communists to enter g overnment emp loy, for fail-
ure to purge the g overnment of such employees, for toleration 
of en alleg ed Communist -controlled union to or g anize the 
government employees, 14 and for acceptance of p olitical 
su ppor t from the CIO which was alle g ed to be domine.ted by a 
g rou p of Communist labor leaders. The adminis tr a t i on may 
have been forced into taking certain measures to avoid re-
prisals at the p olls. A clos e relationship existed between 
the CIO a nd the Administre.tion. CertBin union s in the CIO 
had been accused of being Communist -controlled. This fact 
may have had the effect of making the public distrustful 
of the Democratic Administr a tion. In eny event, the Re -
publican ·p arty won a Con gressional ma.jority in the 1946 
elect:i.ons . 
During the 19~-6 and 19~-7 period, the Chamber was a lso 
vitally interested in another nation a l issu e, the problem of 
labor-ma nagement accord. This issue was g iven very little 
publicit y b y the Chamber . The public was not infor med by 
pamphlets. Hov;ever, as s oon as the 80th C on gr es s was in 
office: 
Th e Chamber presented to the people the facts a b out 
the issue and the need for remedial legis lation. The 
soundness of the Chamber 's B.pproa.ch wes clearly ind i ca-
ted b y the similarity of views expressed b y a Congressional 
ma jority in the passage of the new labor act. 15 
14 Communists Within The Government, 1947, H . S: . 
Chamber, p:--r)). 
15 Nat. Encycl. Yr. Book , 19L~7, Q.P. q.JJ;., p . 350. 
The new labor act was the Taft-Ha.rtley Law, a legislative 
act, curbing or limiting the power of labor. During the 
session of the 80th Congress: 
More than 250 anti-labor bills were introduced ••• 
These bills called for repeal of the Wagner Act , re-
pe a l of the Wa ges and Hours Law, repeal of the Norris-
La Gu ardia Anti-Injunction Law, revision of the Anti-
Trust Law to make it a.pply to unions, outlawing of the 
closed shop, compulsory arbitration, the Bal l-Burton-
Hatch Bill ••• and the Taf t-Hartley Bill. 16 
Although the Taft-Hartley l aw contained provisions 
whi ch required labor leaders to si gn non-Communist affilla-
tion affidavits, the major part of the law was directed at 
curbing the power of organized labor and increasin g the 
freedom of action in labor relations on the pa rt of mana.ge -
ment. 
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The Ch&~ber may be apprehensive lest Communism acquire 
dominance in the trade of the countries not now under 
Communist control. The Chamber may fear the spread of 
Communism because the Chamber's policies are incompatible 
with the Commu nist theory of economics. However, the threat 
of Communism in the United S tates at the time of the Chamber's 
publications was not comparable to other parts of the world. 
That the Chamber's use of the Communist issue may have been 
a means to an end may be obs erved by the fact th a t after the 
Republic a.n victory, and the expuls i ons in the CIO, the Chamber 
16 Philip Foner, The Fu~ and Leather Workers, p. 642. 
published its 1952 Report on Communism, wherein the Chmnber 
admitted that the Communist Party we.s broken and that the 
Communists in this country now number approximately 35,000. 17 
It is therefore questionable if the Communists ever con-
stituted the threat the Chamber purported them to be. How-
ever, it is a fact that the Communist issue played a major 
pa~t in weakening the power of the CIO. It helped to create 
more freedom of choice on the part of management and to es-
tablish a balance of power in favor of management. The Re-
~1blican victory strengthened the power of the Chamber in 
the g overnment. These were all objectives for which the 
Chamber had aimed. 18 The Chamber may have taken advantage 
of an external situation which existed in the international 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and used the Communist threat as a power weapon to win 
public support for its policies against two of its oppo-
nents, the Democratic Administration and the CIO. 
The Cmronunist issue was also used against the CIO 
by other public opinion groups, but for different purposes 
and objectives. The next section will discuss such groups. 
Chosen for discussion is the Association of Catholic Trade 
Unionists ( ACTU), and the Catholic Church. 
17 u. s. Chamber 1952 Report on Co~~unism, p. 5. 
-- -- -
18 Policy Declaration 1949, u. s . Chamber of Cotnmerce. 
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IV. THE CATHOLI C CHURCH AND THE 
ASSOCIATION OF CATHOLIC TRADE UNIONISTS 
The Catholic Church has been an implacable foe of 
Communism since its beginning . No compromise is possible 
between religion and materialistic atheism. 19 The Church's 
interest in the social order dates back to the time of the 
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Communism since its beginning . No compromise is possible 
between religion and materialistic atheism. 19 The Church's 
interest in the social order dates back to the time of the 
Church's inception. Communism, whose basic values are ex-
pressed in the theory of man's ability to determine his own 
destiny and wellbein g through the common control of material 
resources and the products thereof, threatens the very exis-
tence of the Church as an organized institution. The struggle 
between Com.-rnunism and the Catholic Church is for the preserve-
tion of the Church as an organized institution. 
In fi ghting Communism, the Church claims it is strik-
ing a ublow for the liberty of man, as well as for her own 
peace and survival in many countriesu. 20 The end sou ght 
by the Catholic Church is its own preservation throu gh a 
social order free from destitution and oppression, which the 
Church maintains stimulates a spirit of revolt against so-
ciety and. 
compe ls some in the direction of c!'ime, and others to 
movements s uch as Communism. Hence, the Church has a 
direct and an indirect interest in c!'usading for a just 
and peaceful social order. Directly, she seeks justice 
and charity in all fields of life. Indirectly, she is 
concerned over the evil roots of injustice and ex-
ploitation. 21 
19 John F. Cronin, SS ., Communism A World Menace, p. 2~ 
20 Ibid., p. 26. 
21 Ibid., p. 25. 
In the United S tates, the Catholic Church has a member -
ship of 28,634,878 22 of which the majority may be considered 
as Democr ats in their politicel affiliation . 23 It is there-
fore unlikel y that the Ameri can Comnru.nist Party which had a 
numerical strength estime ted at 73,000 in 19~-5, and 35 ,000 
in 1952, constitutes a serious threet to the Church in the 
United S tates . The threat of Cow~unism is further r emoved 
since the expose' of Communism, and the subsequent public 
alertness to any p ossible Communist moves. 
Interference with the function of the Catholic Church 
in countries und er the Ru ssian s phere of influence, hss g iven 
the Church cause for concern. The Chur ch is sensitive to the 
st etus, role, a nd trends of or ganized labor, for t h e Church 
h as found th et in the labor unions is found the greatest nu-
mer ical streng th of Communism. This is esp e cially true in 
the European unions. The Church discovered that, to the 
extent that Communists ce.n claim power in the la.bor mov ement, 
t he ir p ositions in the g overnment are streng thened. Officials 
wh o do not co-operpte can be threatened with reprisals at the 
pol ls. The Church , in order to survive, needs a g overnment 
in powel' thet is in sympathy with the Church's soc ia l theo-
ries, and labor unions which will accept the Church's sociel 
pl, ogram . It becomes evident why P ope Leo XIII , as early as 
--~-------------· 
22 111Census of Reli gious Bodies in U . S . 111 , World 
Al manac, 1952, P• 482. 
2~ /Paul Lazarsfeld , et al., The People 's Choi c e , 
pp . 1 ff. 
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1891, advocated the formation of Catholic labor organizations 
thl'ou gh which the Church could put iiB social theories into 
pr a ct i ce, and thus test them ag ainst the secular theories of 
Marx and Engels. 
In the United States, where there is a separation of 
Churc h and State, the Catholic Church had to adapt its pro-
gr am to the prevailing institutionalized patterns of the 
socio-political structure. In the field of labor, the Church 
is not engaged in forming s Catholic union. Up to the time 
of the organization of the CIO, the Church was content to 
play a passive role regarding labor activities. In 1937, the 
Chu rch changed its role from a passive to an active parti-
ci pant in labor's organizational activities. The time of 
this change coincides with the time of the organization of 
the CIO by John L. Lewis, who because of a time element and 
a shortage of organizers accepted help in organizing the CIO 
from individuals, who had gained organizing experience and 
knowl e dge of labor problems by attendin g classes in labor 
sch ools. Such classes were conducted by Schools of S ocial 
Scienc e, Colleges, Universities, Unions, and individuals with 
experience in the field. S ome of the teachers were Marxian 
ori e nted in their views. It is possible that some of the 
CIO or g anizers were Cmmnunists. The fact that in 1945 the 
CIO helped organize, and wes a member of the World Federa-
tion of Trade Unionists of which the S oviet trade unions 
also was a member, may h Gve caused the Church to consider it 
a possibility that the CIO 's policies mi ght be influenced by 
the European Communist unions' policies, which were anti-
clerical and anti-Catholic. 
The Catholic Church in the United States, throu gh its 
De pe r tment of Soci al . A~c .ti on , in the spring of 1937 or g en i ze d 
the Association of C etholi c Trad e Unionists ( ACTU ) • The ai ms 
of t he or ganization are based on the 1931 encyclical of Pope 
Pius XI which st ates in part: 
1J\lherever it (is) impossible for Ca tholics to form 
Cath olic unions •• • they (Catholic workers) seem to h ave 
no r ec ourse but to enroll themselves in neutral t rade 
u nions ••• Side by side with these tr ade unions, there 
must always be associt:ttions which a im at giving their 
members a thorough reli gious and moral training that 
the se in t urn may impart to the labor unions to which 
they belong the upri ght4spirit which should direct t heir entire conduct. 2 
P ope Pius' dictum of uthorough reli gious and mor al 
trs.iningtt h as been translated by the ACTU as me aning job 
security, collective bargainin g , and a share in profits 
after reasonable wages and return to capital has been paid. 
P.:.CTU member s ere admonished that they must respect private 
pr oper ty , co-operate with hon e st employers, and attempt to 
secure industrial pe Bce throu gh management-worker associ a -
tions which desire a voice in the operation Bnd a share in 
t he pr ofits of industry. '~The ACTU tells its members the y must 
r e ject completely the Marxist princi ple of class strugg le as 
24 nThe Uprl" ght ~pir1"t " Fortune Nov 1946 p 188 
- oq) , - ., ' • • 
an indispensable feature of presen t d ey societyw. 25 
To accomplish its aims , the AC~J conducts Catholic 
labor schools, prints labor newspapers such a s The Lab or 
Lead~r , holds conferences with industry and conducts 
spirituel act iv ities B.mong its members. 26 The te 2chers 
at the ACTU labor schools are g eneral ly priests. 
The De partment of Social Ac tion of the Nation al 
Catholic Welfare Conference has cond uc ted many meeting s 
Pnd sch ools for priests ••• many priests have take n formal 
academlc tr aining on social questions to su9plemen t the 
c mn~ses now being given in semina.ries . 27 
There were appr oximately 10,000 Catholic members in the ACTU 
in 1946 . The y were distributed in seven chapters in New 
York, Detroit, Pittsbur gh , Car y , Cleveland , San Francisco , 
Rnd Oak l and . These traine d members are sent to work within 
the Un ited States trad e unions to impart to the members the 
"·upr i gh t spirit'~ c alled for by the Vatican . 28 
The ACITT wes successful in Detroit in 1946. I ts 
1,000 members , 80-90 percent of whom belong to the CIO, 
principal ly the :Jnited Au tomobile Workers, supp orted 1 lalter 
Reuther and were a major factor in the defeat of t he Thomas -
Addes - Le onard slate. Ge or ge P .. ddes, although a Catholic , 
opposed the A.CTU , alon g with Communists , Soc ialists, and 
25 Loa. cit., See Labor Leader "·15 Anniver sBry AC~J "• 
Feb . 29 , 19 52, p . 1 . 
26 V1ha t Does the ACTU HeBn to You, ACTU , 327 Lex. Ave ., 
N. Y. 
27 c· · · t ;Jr: r onln, op. ~ ' p . -J • 
28 Fortune, op . cit., p . 1 38 . 
Trotskyites of being 
ti ghtly knit factions ••• (which) attempt to use the 
union e. s a vehicle for achieving their respective 
or ganizational or political goals. This statement 
offended Catholics and left-wingers almost equally. 29 
This s tatement however, we.s not denied by the ACTU . 
uACTU members have tried determinedly to unseat the 
leftis t executive body of the United Electrical, Radio, and 
Ma chine Workers - a campaign that failed during the union's 
recent (1946) conventionn . 30 The attempts by the ACTIT to 
dislodge the leadership of the UE continued and failed con-
sistently. The ACTU attempts to change the leedership of a 
union, whose policies are not in sympathy or conformity with 
the principles and programs of the Church's social program, 
and labor policies. An effective means used by the ACTU 
members is to charge the opposition with being Communistic, 
Communist-controlled, or with bein g in sympathy with 
Communist policy in world affe.irs. The ACTU, working within 
the CIO, also attempted to eliminate their opposing canal-
d etes by parliamentary or political maneuvers. In the case 
of the UE, the ACTU worked with Carey in his unsuccessful 
attempt to split the UE into small factions. 3l 
The ACID te.kes no official position on specific le.bor 
issues. One of its primary interests is action against 
29 Loc. cit. 
30 Loc. cit. 
31 UE Convention Pr oceedings, 1949, p. 212. 
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Comrnun i.sm. The ACTU seeks to control the area in t he social 
structul'e wher e the ideologies of the Church and its or gani-
zation are threatened. By developing labor leaders who are 
i n sympathy with the aims and policies of the social program 
of the Church, 32 the Church may indirectly exercise a cer-
tsin amount of control over the unions' policies and thus 
el iminat e the possibility of a threat arising against the or-
gsnlz a tional structure of the Church. 
Although the Chamber and the Catholic Church may both 
h ave used the threat of Communism as a. means to an end, they 
have divergent views on labor. The Chamber wes one of the 
sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Btll. The ACTU and the Social 
Action De par tment of the Church actively condemned and opposed 
the T-H Bill. The Church supports the :rights of workers to 
str ike . The Chamber does not. P ope Leo XI I I, in his Rerum 
.. 
Nov arum in 1891, went so far as to advocate mthe for ma tion 
of Catholic labor or g anizationst~ . 33 Many such unions exist 
tod ~y in several European countries. The ACTU in co-opere.-
tion with departments of the Church conducts labor schools 
and prints labor public ations. The Chamber does not. On 
May 15, 1931, Pope Pius XI issued his encyclical on the 
Reconstruction of the Social Order. In this encyclical, he 
32 Here Is What The ACTU Stands For, AC TU leaflet, 
pp. 1 f; u1wnat' IS ~Ac1ft"f"UE:Oftor1a1, La'Oor Leader, Feb. 
2 9 ' 19 52 ' p. 3. 
33 Carl Eckhardt, The Papacy and World Affair s , p . 250. 
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denounced the basic tenets of capitalism, recognized the rights 
of workers to organize, and gave several proposals for the con-
trol of social and economic problems . The Chamber, o~ the 
other hand, is the defender and supporter of free enterprise 
c api ta.li sm. However, both the Chamber and the Church con-
ducted a public cruapai gn against a number of unions in the 
CIO, including the UE , which were alleged to be Communist 
controlled . Based on the objectives sought by these organi-
zat i ons respectively, the Cammunist issue appears to have 
been used to obtain organizational objectives . The aim of 
the Chamber may have been to weaken the power of the CIO 
politically as well as numerically. The Church neither 
favored or desired to weaken the power of the CIO, but wa.nt-
ed the urcommunists'~ replaced by '~bona fidet~ union leaders, 
prefel~a.bly leaders trained by the ACTIJ. The Chamber and the 
Church, in spite of their divergent views on social and 
ec onomic issues, used the threat of Communism to the nation 
as a. means of winning public support against the CIO-Demo-
crstic ·party coalition. Through this support, they may have 
hoped to gain control over legislative measures which affected 
their respective objectives. The United States Chamber of 
Commerce appeared to have used the Communist issue as a means 
to obtain economic ends. The Catholic Church appeared to 
have used the Communist issue as a means to insure organiza-
tional survival. 
These activities on the part of public opinion groups 
had their effects on the relationship which existed between 
the CI O and the Democratic Perty. Poll tical parties which 
depend on the electorate to support their candidates for 
off ice are naturally sensitive to public opinion. 
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As the relations between the United States end the 
Soviet Union bec8m.e strained, and the exlsting interna.tional 
relations deteriorated, the external situation fur nished the 
anti-Communist and e.nti-union associations with materiel for 
their ca.rnpai gn to mold public opinion. Once such a campai gn 
is set in motion it he.s an accumulative effect and reaches 
into all areas of public life. 
How these activities on the part of the Chamber, the 
Church, and other associations affected the relations with-
in the CIO will be presented in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
RELATI ONStiTPS WITHIN THE 
CONGRESS otP INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
I. THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE CIO 
The CIO is a confederation of local unions, national 
unions and internationals. There are thirty or forty unions 
in the CIO. The unions exercise a greet deal of ~mtonomy. 
UltirMJ.te decisions and power rest with the membership, .1:1h ich 
decides whether or not the union shall affiliate with or 
s e c e de from any federation. The unions hsve their own con-
stitut i ons, which in the CIO affiliated unions, vary little. 
The constitutions guarantee certain rights to the union mem-
bers. A member may appeal adverse decisions from his loc2l 
to the union or to the membership at large. In the same 
manner , under the CIO constitution, the union may carry its 
appe 81 to the membership at the National CIO Convention. 
The convention is the hi ghest authority in all CIO 
un i ons. The convention, which meets annually or bi-Bnnually, 
is the supreme legislative body of the internationals and 
unions. The delegates to the conventions are elected directly 
by the members they represent. Generally, the elections are 
by s e c r et ballot. Dele gates are free to express their opin-
ion s and cast votes in proportion to the number of workers 
they re p resent. Generally, such conventions are open to the 
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public. Proportional represen tation is important to note be -
caus e it means thet the la!' ger the local or union is, the 
greater is its vote. In th~ national CIO conventions, the 
lar ger the union, the greater is its number of voting dele-
g~ t e s , and the greater is the influence of its representa-
tives on the CIO Executive Board . It will be shown later 
how imp ortan t this fact is in the matter of control in the 
CI O. 
Di!'ection of the unions !'ests with their top officers 
and their General Executive Boards . The officers are nom-
inate d and elected by the members, or by delegates re p!'e-
s enting the members a t the union conventions . Most of the 
offi cers are elected to terms of not more than two yee!'s , 
and five unions elect their top officers every year • .Among 
these five unions is the United Electrical, Radio and r_achine 
Workers (UE ). 
The loc als of the CIO unions collect month l y dues. A 
portion, rarely exceeding one dollar, is turned over to the 
union end is called the t·tper c api tan tax. Ei ght cents of 
the monthly ~per capita~ tax is kept by the national CIO to 
support its nationwide activities. The unions also pay 0 per 
capi ta '" tax to loc el and state CIO councils. CIO state coun-
ci l s have a formal structure similar to the national CIO, but 
their primary activity is political in nature. The 0 per cap-
ita" tax k eeps the CIO financially solvent. The CIO could 
no t operate without the fin anci al su ppor t from its affili a ted 
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unions. It wi 11 be noted later that withholding of the ttper 
capi t r. ~• tax by a union may be tantamount to the severance of 
affiliation. Withholding the ta.x may be used as a means in 
an B.ttempt to obtain action on urgent matte:r s , vit a l to the 
union, which have been delayed by the national CIO. 
The national CIO consists of an Executive Council com-
posed of a president, secret sry-tre as urer , and nlne vice pre -
sid ents . u'In 1948 the Exe cutive C01..:tncil included the presi-
dents of the textile workers, rubber workers, electrical 
workers (UE ), and oi l workers . " 1 The power of these men 
rests on the streng th of their respective unions. Each man 
h a s an effective veto over any proposal which mi ght affect 
his union adversely and can exercise his veto power by 
thr ea tening to withdraw his union from the federation . 2 
These men formul ate the policies of the CIO. These poli cies 
ere then presented to the General Executive Board ( GE B) , 
which consists of forty to fifty representatives of the CIO 
affiliated unions. Same members of this Board are al so 
salB.ried members of the staff of the CIO. The members of 
the GEB are nominated and elected directly by the members or 
by delegates representing the members at the national CIO 
conventions. 3 The GEB conducts the affairs of the national 
1 Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Rela -
tions, p . 142. 
2 Ibid., p . 143. 
3 The formal structure of the CIO is based on excerpts 
from The CIO , What!! !E._ And Wha~ !_!Does, CIO publication , 
1951 . 
CIO between conventions. The GEB also carries out the poli-
cies adopted at the national conventions and may formulate 
pol icies for adoption at the next convention. The Board 
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also passes on matters concerning questions on jurisdictional 
disputes between the unions. At times, one union will attempt 
to organize a group of workers, who ordinarily would come 
under the jurisdiction of another union. In some cases where 
the GEB has not been successful in settling the disputes, 
the National Labor Relations Board, a government agency, has 
been called upon to hold elections, thus giving the union 
members the choice of determining which union should be the 
bargaining agent representing them. The Board must also make 
decisions on problems arising when one union attempts to 
"raid" local unions away from the national or international 
union. Raiding is one of the more serious, and as yet, un-
solved problems confronting labor federations. Raiding can 
be serious to the union being raided, because the loss o~ 
several of its local unions may mean the reduction in status 
of the union itself. As one union loses some of its locals, 
another union gains in relative importance and power. A 
union, with major representation on the GEB and major voting 
strength at the national convention, may be reduced to a 
union of minor importance if it is subjected to raids. 
Raiding of its unions may have been one of the major factors 
that may have forced the leadership of the UE to dissent in 
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order to prevent dismemberment of the international union. 
The CIO Political Action Commit tee (PAC) is a semi-
autonomous committee which receives financial support through 
voluntary contributions from the members of the various CIO 
unions throughout the nation. The president of the CIO is 
a member of the PAC. Most of the larger CIO unions have re-
presentatives on the PAC Executive Board. The PAC carries 
out the political policies of the CIO. Technically the PAC 
is non-partisan. Generally it has given unqualified support 
to the New Deal policies and has supported New Deal candi-
dates for office. It will be shown later that one .faction 
on the CIO Executive Board attempted to change the authority 
of the PAC Executive Board, on matters concerning the control 
of the political activities and policies of the CIO affiliates. 
This action was opposed by some of the CIO unions, ~ and led 
the UE to dissent from the rulings of the PAC Board. 
In considering the action of the CIO against the UE, 
the contention was that a series of events precipitated the 
final action of the CIO. Therefore, it seems logical to con-
tinue the study investigating the relationship between some 
of the CIO unions, particularly the UE-CIO relationshi-p. 
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II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CI 0 AND THE UE 
Until the end of World War I I, the internationals and 
other u nions of the CIO appeared to work together without 
serious difficult i es arising in their relationships. However, 
at the end of the war, there was a noticeable change in the 
relationship between some of the leaders of the CI O unions. 
This chang e eventually led to the expulsion of several CIO 
affi liates from the CIO. These unions were accused by anti -
un i on and anti-Communist associations of being Communist-
controlled. The unions were: 
Farm Equipment and Metal Workers 
United Electrical, Radio, and ~ achine Workers 
Food, Tobacco, and Agricultural Workers 
Mine, l'.'Iill and Smelter Workers 
Office and Professional Workers 
Unit ed Public Workers 
P~erican Communications Associations 
Fi shermen and Allied Workers 
Fur and Le a ther Workers 
Furniture Workers 
Longsh oremen and Warehousemen 
Marine Cooks and Stewards 1 
A group of unlon lee.ders in the CIO, representing 
twenty-nine national and international unions, also con-
sldered the unions name d above to be Communist-controlled . 
1 The CIO, What It Is and ~~at It Does, CI O publica-
ti on #173:-1950, p:-Il.--
52 
Thus, for purposes of identification, it may be said that two 
factions existed within the CIO, a left wing faction made up 
of the unions tha.t were accused of being Communist-controlled 
and a ri ght wing faction composed of the anti-Communist 
unions . The left wing faction °represented approximately 
six and one-half percent of the dues-paying membership of the 
National CI0. 0 2 It constituted 0 less than ten percent of 
the to ·~al membership.u 3 The largest union of the left wing 
faction was the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers 
(UE ). The UE was the third largest of the CIO affiliates. 
The leaders of the UE may be considered the leaders of the 
left wing faction. The large st right wing union was the 
Uni ted Au tomobile Workers (UAW) and by 1949, it had become 
the largest of the CIO affiliated unions . Walter Reuther, 
president of the UAW , was recognized as the leader of the 
ri ght win g or anti-Communist bloc. 4 
All of the unions involved had representatives on 
val'ious committees within the CIO and me.ny of them were re-
presented on the Executive Board of the CIO. This is an 
important fact because, as noted in Section I, the Executive 
Board is a policy making body and also conducts the affairs 
of the CIO between conventions. The size of the Executive 
2 CIO Convention Proceedings, 1949, p. 278. 
3 Ibid., P. 54 • 
4 Communists Within the Labor Movement, Ch amber of 
Commer ce public eti on, 1947, P. 6. 
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Board varies, depending on the number of unions entitled to 
representation on the Board . Therefore, the Executive Board 
was also divided, eleven or twelve members representing the 
left wing faction, and approximately thirt y members represent-
ing the ri ght wing faction. The power of the left wing mem-
bers on the Executive Board was much gre ater t han the power 
of t he ten percent they re pre sented in the membership. The 
left wing representation on the policy making Board of the CIO 
constituted a formidable minority, when discussion of policy 
arose . According to Philip Murray, president of the CIO: 
The Executive Board meetings of the CI O since the fall 
of l946 ••• focus themselves upon one issue, and one issue 
alone, and that is the issue of Communism. These ll or 
12 unions ••• supported the foreign policy of the Soviet 
g overnment against the g overnment of the United Sta tes 
of America at every meeting of our Executive Boal"d. 5 
Specifically, these unions were charged with h~ving 
vot ed against the CI 0 1 s international policies and against 
CIO supp ort of Harry S. Truman for President. In the expul-
sian proceedings agains t the UE, par t of which fol l ows, it 
was charged that: 
1. The CIO and the American people support the 
Marshall Plan ••• 
The Soviet Union, the Communist Party an d their 
hi ghly placed agents . in the UERMWA (UE ) unite in de-
nouncing the Marshall Pla.n. 
2. The CIO along with the A.mericr.m people support 
the Atlantic Pact to pre vent any further expansion of 
the Soviet Unions rule ••• 
The Soviet Union, the Communist Party and the UE 
lead ership at tack the Atlantic Pact as war-mongering . 
5 CIO Convention Pr oceedings , op. cit., p. 275. 
3· In the field of political action, the UE le ader-
shi p , crying a loud for unit y an d autonomy , joined with 
Wall Str eet ••• to defeat liberalism a nd democracy in the 
United States. Ag ainst the desire and interests of the 
Americ an Labor Moveme nt, the UE leadership joined with 
the Communist Party in creating the mis-n amed Progress-
ive Part y . 
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5· In cynical and outri ght defiance of the CIO, the 
UE l eadership secretly arr enged a mer ger with the United 
Farm Equ ipment and Metal Workers of America (F~ ) which 
had loudly proclaimed its demand for independence, when 
ord er ed by the CIO Executive Board to mer ge with the U.AW. 
Thi s mer ger of FE and UE wa.s the first step in the long 
rang e plans of the Communist Party to establish a 
Communi st-dominated labor f ederation in Americ a .• 
7. The final stage in the UE leadership program f~ 
leaving the CIO and establishing a Communist-domin a ted 
lab or federation was re ached on October 7, 1949 . When 
the of ficers of the UE served an ultimatum upon the 
Pre s i dent of the CIO ••• demanding that the CI O chang e 
its policies, tha t CI O subordinate itself to the UE , 
and t hat President Mqrray plead guilty to false and 
def amatory charges. 6 . 
Sec ti on 4 and 6, omitted in the above quotation, st a ted 
t hat the UE charg ed the CIO 's fi ght to re peal the Taft-Har t le y 
Ac t , a s e llou t and that the UE also attacked Murray 's handling 
of t he steel strik e in 1949, Rwhile hypocritically calling for 
f inanc ial support to the strikers." 
The CIO officially had endorsed and supported the poli-
cies, which the UE was char ged with opposin g . The policies 
were a part of the CIO program and therefore, the minorit y had 
been out-voted. Whether or not the minority supported the 
poli ci es had no effect upon the policies. 
6 I bid., pp. 303 f. 
The expulsions may be an indication that the right 
wing faction took advantage of the ideological issue existing 
in the external situation. The right wing faction, by its 
action, conformed to the demands of the administration, the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and other anti-
Communist associations which demanded that the CIO purge 
itself of Communists. 
By deciding to withdraw from the World Federation of 
Trade Unionists (vVFTU), 7 the right wing faction satisfied 
the demands of the Administration - and the Catholic Church's 
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Social Welfare Committe. The right wing faction had the 
support of the Association of -Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). 
The ACTU actively supported Walt~r Reuther in his rise to 
power within the UAW and the CIO. The ACTU was a major factor 
in bringing about the defeat of the Thomas-Addes-Leonard 
slate in the UAW. The ACTU members have also tried deter-
minedly to unseat the leftist body of the UE.8 
Three points in the expulsion proceedings were of in-
terest to the problem of the paper. The first was the fact 
that the UE was expelled from the UIO on charges based on 
an ideological issue. The second was the statement by Philip 
Murray that the difficulties began in 1946. The third was 
the statement in the resolution to expel the UE, in which 
the Resolutions Committee reported that on October 7, 
7 Ibid., pp. 59; 176-180. 
8 
"The Upright Spirit", Fortune, November 1946, p. 188. 
1949, the UE officers served an "ultimatum" to President 
Murray demanding that the CIO subordinate its policies to 
the UE , 
Concerning Murray's statement, a question may be Etsked . 
If the situation had existed in the CIO since 19h6, why was 
action delayed until 1949? According to Murray, ufrom Decem-
ber 7, 1941 until Au gust 7, 1945, he received the united 
support of the left wing elements." 9 Murray's dating of 
1946 es a cruci a l year in the CIO history may have been due 
to several events·, which occurred, during that year . I t was 
a turbulent year in CIO history. 
The end of the war brought a rapidly deteriorating re-
lationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The public was informed of the danger of Communism . The 
arms aid to Greece and the Marshall Plan were issues with 
which the CIO had to deal. The Marshall Plan was accepted 
by all in principle, but some of the practical aspects of 
the p lan were opposed by the left wing faction. The accept-
anc e of the Marshall Plan involved the WFTU because the 
Russi en and other Communist unions voiced their opposition 
to the Marshall Plan. It was a difficult problem for the 
CI O, for Philip Murray and James Carey both had been the 
principal movers in helping to or ganize the WF~J in 19h5· 
The CIO was also facing the we.ve of post-ws.r reaction 
9 CIO Convention Proceedin gs, op. cit ., p . 275. 
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to controls~ restrictions on wages, and unemployment, result-
ing from we.r production cut-becks. The conception of the 
pos t-w ar wage campai gn and its practic a l epplication was 
largely the work of the CIO. At this time, Walter Reuther, 
the director of the General Motors division within the UAW , 
i ni ti atec1 the campaign by opening negoti a.ti on s, whlch in-
eluded several innova.tions. Since the campE~.i g n was for wage 
incre ases for the entire CIO, the CI O, to show unity of pur-
pose had to support Reuther. As a result, the Steel, uta-
mobile end UE workers became involved in long and costly 
strikes. 10 In his action, Reuther took the initiative away 
from the Steel Workers, the traditional pattern setters, for 
the CIO. 
In the political field, the CIO faced other difficul-
ti es. In the 1946 elections, support of candidates by the 
CI O ·Politic8l Action Committee (PAC) proved to be more of a 
handic ap than a benefit. In the national and local elections, 
Republicans were swept into office. The change in the 
political party representation exposed the CIO to the threat 
of loc al and federal legislation, regulating the powers of 
labor unions. 
The CIO also lost two powerful supporters in the deaths 
of President Roosevelt and ,Sidney Hillman. Hillman was one 
of the CIO's most experienced and astute leaders. He had 
10 Leo Wolman, t Labor end Unemployment u , Colliers 
Yes.r Book, 1947, p. 311-. 
been tbe founder and moving spirit of the powerful ¥AC. On 
his de2th, there was no one with comparable cepe.city within 
the CIO to succeed him. Within several of the CIO unions 
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and within the CIO or ganization, there existed fectional 
dif f erences between the leaders, which were partly doctrinal 
and partly personal. Through all the differences, ran the 
fact of Communist infiltration and the fear of Communist 
domination. 11 The difficulties were brought before the 
public in 1946. 
In the U.AW , in 1946, Walter Reuther, leader of the 
anti-Communist forces defeated R. J. Thomes for the presi-
dency and assumed political control of that organization. 
Similar contests for political supremacy were waged in the 
Mar itime, Electrical and Radio and other unions. 12 In the 
UE, James B. Carey, secretery-treasurer of the CIO and one 
time president of the UE, waged an anti-Communist campaign 
age.in s t the UE leaders, Albert Fi tzgera.ld, Julius Emspt'lk and 
Jame s Matles. Carey was assisted by the ACTU-UE members. 
It :';l,s ·seeno that a combine.tion of events in the ex-
ternal situation may have created a condition that made the 
us e of the Communist issue a powerful means for the ri ght-
wing faction to use in en attempt to change the order of ex-
isting relationships in the CIO. The external situation was 
11 Loa. cit. 
12 i Loc. c t. 
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polit i cal in nature, therefore, the activities of the ri ght-
wi ng faction in the CIO and its affiliates were politically 
or ien ted. The right-wing faction justified its ac t ions on 
the gr ounds that it was elimi nating Communism from the CIO. 
However, the fe_ct that the ri ght-wing faction, three ye ars 
lat er, h ed to amend the CI O constitution and resort to ex-
pu l s i ons ma y indicate th a t some of the campai gns were un-
succes sfu l. The membership of t he left-wing unions may ha ve 
jud ged or ganizati onal efficiency to be of greater importance 
then political beliefs or ideologies. 
The third point of i mportance was the nultimatum" sent 
to Mr. Murray by the UE leader ship. It was the last of sever-
al c ommunications tha t h ad been sent to Murray . The nulti-
ma t um11  we_s a resolution against rEdding Bnd dicte_torship in 
t he CI O. The resolution was passed at the 14th Convention 
of t h e UE -CIO in 1949 . Parts of the res6lution, which are 
cons i dered pertinent to the problem of the paper follow: 
From the beginning of April 1948 , until the end of 
July 1949, the National Office of the CIO , the CI O Au t o 
Workers, the United Steel Workers end the CIO Communica-
tion Workers of America h ave attempted to ra_id ~-56 TJE 
shops. In 418 cases these efforts were defeated. Thirt y-
ei gh t r P. id s conducted in collusion with employers were 
su cc es sful ••• 
Gradually over the year s , individuals in the top 
le edership of the CIO and some of its a.ffilieted unions 
have sou ght ••• to transform the CIO from an instrumental-
ity and servant of the unions and their membershi ps to a 
dic ta torship over unions and members alike ••• Two ye ars 
ag o, this group used t h e CI O Executive Board to decree 
tha.t the CI O should henceforward subordina.te itself to 
the political interests of the Democratic Party le ader-
ship~ • • This group ••• demands absolute and complete con-
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formity on all matters of politics as a condition for re-
maining in the CIO . This policy of subo!'dinating the in-
terests of the CIO unions to the political dictates of 
the CIO leede!'ship is defended on the g!'ound that it re-
presents the will of the maj ol'ity. The majority refer!'ed 
to actuelly consists of some 30 members of the CIO Execu-
tive Boerd , a subs t ~n ti al numbe!' of whom . a!'e paid or sub-
sidized di!'ectly fl'om the treasul'Y of the CIO. Eecause 
they could not hope to win volunta.ry complianc e with 
(this) policy ••• and because they could not impose dicta-
tion from the top, the CIO officialdom has turned to 
threats, compulsion, raiding and union wrecking to i mp ose 
their policy on CIO unions, including the UE . 
Representatives of the national office and the leaders 
of the UAW at a UAW Executive Board meeting in March 1948 
plotted to raid and dismember the UE . The raids were 
c ommenced in Hartford and Brooklyn with raids by the UAVV 
upon a numb er of UE or ganized shops. 
Between March 12, 1948 and Janu.ary 7, 1949 , the UE 
addressed itself to Pres ident Murray upon this subject 
on si x di fferent occasions and conferred with him four 
times. No moves of any kind were made by him t o halt 
the raids. The UE submitted to the last convention a 
resolution condemning the raiding within the CI O. This 
resolution was never permitted to !'each either the Reso-
l u ti on Com.rnittee or the floor of the CI O convention. 
In May (1949) , the CIO Executive Board made it official 
CIO policy that representat ives on the CIO Executi ve Board 
ha d to comply or get out. 
Continuing the resolution the UE p!'esented its demands, which 
in abb:t•eviated form follow: 
1. All raided unions will be returned and charte!'s 
rest ored. 
2. The President of the CIO is to direct affiliated 
uni.ons to stop raiding , promoting secession and dual 
unionism against the WE . If not stopped , the President 
will file appropriate charges with the Executive Board . 
3· The CIO officers who have participated in promotin g 
raids, secessions and dual unionism against the UE shall 
be removed from the payroll in accordance with Article V, 
Section 3 of the CIO constitution. 
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4. The Pr esident of the CIO is to immediately dir ect 
CIO secretary-treasurer, James B. Carey to cease end de-
sist from wrecking activities within the UE and to stop 
s pending fu nds of the CIO for purposes of undermining 
the UE . The President should take this a ction in accord -
ance with his repeated st a temen ts to the Gener a l Officers 
of the UE since 1941, in which he condemned these activi-
ties of Carey and promised to take action. 
In the event the UE Executive Board does not receive 
ass :trances from the President of the CIO , the convention 
authorizes the Board to withhold per capita tax from the 
CI O for such time as it deems necessary: •• 13 
In his reply to the request, Murray stated: 
Gentlemen , there is no way under the sun in which you 
and I could ever hope to I!esolve these lss ues - not t h e 
i ssues tha.t you have presented to me e.lone, but the funda-
mentel issue, the big issue, the issue of Communism. S o 
I have therefore, decided to refer your communication and 
your requests to the Committee on Resolutions, and in due 
cou:r•se, they will pl:'esen t 4their formal recommendations to the National Convention. 1 
In the 1949 CIO convention order of business, the Con-
stitu t ion Committee was the fil:'st to report. It recommended 
the adop tion of the CIO constitutlon with the following amend -
ment : 
Page 10: Article IV concerning Officers end lJ:xecutive 
Board is amended by insertion of e new Se ct ion 4, which 
l:'ead s as follows: 
Section 4. No individual shall be eligible to serve 
either a.s an officer or B.S e. member of the Executive 
Board, who is a. membel:' of the Communist Pe.rty , any 
f as cist ol:'ganization ol:' other tot a litarie.n movement, or 
wh o consistently pursues policies toward the achievement 
of the program or the purposes of the Communist "Party, 
any fascist organization or other totali tal:'ia.n movement 
rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the 
Constitution of the CIO. 15 
13 14th C onven ti on Proceedings, UE-CI 0, 1949, pp. 103 ff. 
lL~ CI O Convention Proceedings, op. cit., p. 322. 
15 Ibid., p. 240. 
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The ame ndment was debated tmd adopted. 
Next , Walter Reuther , che.irman of the Resolut i ons 
Conmi t te e, re ported the re commendBtions of the committee on 
the mB tter of the UE , which follows in part : 
Resolution No. 58 
On The Expu lsion of the UE 
We c an no longer tolerate within the family of the CI O, 
the Commu nist Party masquerading as a labor union. The 
time has come when we must strip the mask from these false 
le ader s whose only purpose it is to deceive and betray 
workers •••• These Communist a gents cry out against ttraid-
i ng an~ secession" . Wh Bt the y call raiding and sec es s ion 
is simply e. mov emen t of workers throwing off the yoke of 
domination. The workers s eek refuge from a_ g ang of men 
who £tre withou t principles ot her than debased loya lt y to 
a forei gn p ower •••• Therefore , in conformance wi th the 
provisions of Article III, Section 6 of our Constituti on, 
this convention hereby expels the United Electrical, 
Radio a nd Machine Work ers 9f Am erica from the Con gress of 
Indu strial Or g anization. lo 
The Resolutions CoiT'mittee i gnored the gri e vances B.nd 
requests of the UE . The UE was in possession of conclus ive 
evid e nce showing that raids were conducted by the UAW. 
Fu.rthermore , the members of the ri ght-win g faction within 
the UE were a gainst rai ding . Deleg ate Michael Fitzpatrick 
who spoke for the minority report, which favored the CIO 
policy said, " We are opposed to raiding in a ll shapes and 
forms ••.• We don 1 t want to see a sing le, solitary local g oing 
to UAW , S teel or any other union.l~ 17 The UE had also 
16 Ibid., pp. 302 f. 
17 TT E Pr oceedings, 1949, op. cit., 112. 
participated in sever a l Na tional Labor Relations Board elec-
tions, where their opponents were known . 
Later ~1t the 1949 convention, .James B. Carey stated in 
pert, 
I was subject to a trial on charges of secession. I 
en gage d in s e c e s s i on , yes • I mak e no bone s a b out j_ t • I 
honestly feel I have the right, inh~rent ri ~ht, to revolt 
against an intolereble situation. l j 
Whe n the CI O convention, elected the General Executive 
Board -members, ~~ urray st ated, 
Ne are departing from the usual procedure in the 
election of our Executive Board members by having the 
convention vote upon esch of the candidates who are 
offered for member ship on the Board. 19 
Previous ly, all nominees h Bd bee n presented and voted upon 
en masse . In 1949 , ri ght-wing nominees were presented first 
and voted into office. Then the nominatlons of the eleven 
left-wing unions were presented and each was rejected by in -
voking the new amen dment to the CIO constitution . Thus, the 
left-wing unions were without representation in the CIO and 
the l'i ght-wing faction was in complete control of the CIO . 
The expulsion of the left-wing Executive Board members did 
not c e.use the members of the left-wing unions to t urn to the 
ri e ht-wing faction. 
The action described in the foregoing pages le ave s a 
number of questions unanswered. Why did the ri ght-wing 
faction find it necess ary to chen ge the CIO constitution in 
or der to expel some of their unions a nd thus weaken the power 
18 Ibid. , 212. 
19 CIO Convention Pr oceedings , op. cit., pp . 497 ff . 
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of the CIO, when, as a matter of recorded fact, the right-
wing f'IS the majority in the CIO had all of its policies 
accepted? Why were all the charges a gainst the left-wing 
fe.ction b8sed on the ideological issue of Communism-? Why 
was the problem of raiding i gnored and never presented at 
previous conventions and Executive Boa.rd meetings? Why were 
none of the charges based on organizational inefficiency? 
Why was the UE the first union to be expelled, rather than 
the Internation al Fur and Leather Workers , whose leader, 
Ben Gold, was admittedly a Communist Party member? Why did 
the UE le a.der s permit the expulsion in preference to sub-
mitting to the rules of an established majority? The answer 
to these questions may be found by asking another q uestion. 
Wa.s Communism the real problem in the UE-CIO controversy? 
It appears that the ideologica.l issue of Communism 
may have been used by the right-wing faction in the CIO as 
a means of eliminating competition and gaining control of 
the CIO. It appears that various individuals, fe.ctions, 
and associations injected an ideological issue, which existed 
between the United States and the Soviet Union , into the 
field of labor relations. This may have been done primarily 
to provide a means whereby specific objectives could be 
reached . The Chamber of Commerce and the Catholic Church's 
Welfare Conference have been cited as examples. 
In the UE-CIO controversy, the danger of Co@nunist 
control of the CIO may not have been the primary reason for 
the expulsions, since the ~ight-wing majo~ity had complete 
cont~ol ove~ the policies of the CIO, while the left-wing 
unions we~e still membe~s of the CIO. It appea~s th at the 
cont~ove~sy within the CIO was an organizational matte~ of 
a competitive st~uggle between the leade~s fo~ powe~. If 
the Communist leade~s had constituted a olea~ and present 
dange~ to the nation and the CIO, it would have been a 
matter for the legal authorities to judge. 
To further illustrate that the Communist th~eat may 
not have been the real issue in the UE-CIO cont~oversy, part 
of Walter Reuthe~'s ~ema~ks at the 1949 convention, concern-
in g the constitutional amendment follow: 
At Atlantic City, ••• I, along with Emil R1eve ••• and 
Ben Gold ••• sat on the resolutions sub-committee •••• We 
passed a resolution unanimously ••• that they ••• the mor-
ally degenerated Left ••• cease and desist in their inter-
ference. But, they didn't, and we went to 'P o~tland, and 
there we got a little bit stronge~ and we said, 'tBoys, 
you have eithe~ got to get all the way into the CIO or 
all the way out."~ At this convention, since these 
b~others have not been able to make up their minds for 
themselves~ 0we a~e going to have to make up thei~ minds for them. 
Reuthe~ then went on to state that with other fellow 
trade unionists it was possible to disagree on a numbe~ of 
t~ade union issues, but, if their loyalties we~e with the 
CIO, they would suppo~t the policies of the CIO because it 
represented the will of the majority. 
But this is not true of the Communist minority be-
cause ••• they want to be able to take Phil Murray on and 
20 Ibid., p . 269. 
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say he sold out - on Taft-Hartley. They want to accuse him 
of collaborating with Wall Street and selling out the 
Steel Workers. 21 
This statement indicates that criticism of the right-wing 
leaders' activities may have been one of the major points at 
issue. Reuther made this point clearer when he stated: 
We don't challenge the Communist Party's right to stand 
up in America ~. and have their say. We don't challenge the 
right of these few people in the CIO to go out and peddle 
the Communist line •••• We challenge and we are going to put a 
stop to their right to peddle the Communist Party line 
with -a CIO label on the wrapper •••• Let them peddle the 
line; let them stand up wherever they can get -an audience 
and peddle the Communist Party line to their hearts con-
tent. But ••• put the Party label on it. Don't put the 
CIO label on it. That's the basic question before us. 
It has nothing to do with the democratic rights of the 
minority. It has everything to do with hol'r a free, 
democratic, voluntary association of working people 
handle their internal affairs. 22 
Reuther expressed no objection to Communists being 
labor leaders, but he objected to the left wing leaders 
controlling CIO unions. This may indicate that Reuther's 
primary objectives were to make his own position secure, 
eliminate opposition to his policies, and gain control of 
the CIO. Hm'lever, as shmvn else"\'lhere, he was not inconsistent. 
Murray and Reuther both maintained that the main issue 
within the CIO was Communism. Reuther was elected president 
of the UAW in 1946 on his premisses to clear the UAW of 
Communist influence and control. However, after the election, 
a series of activities on the part of Reuther appear to have 
21 Ibid., p. 270. 
22 Loc. cit. 
been oriented toward the objective of making the UAW the 
l Rr gest and most powerful union in the CIO re_the:r than elimin-
ati ng Communists or Communism from the UAW . In any event, no 
locals were expelled from the UAW because they were Communist-
con trolled and no individuals were expelled for Communist 
act i vities, althou gh some le aders were displaced. Thomas, 
whom Reu ther defeated for the presidency of the TJAW , continue d 
a s a Vice President and a p a id employee of the national CI 0 
off i ce staff. 
Further evidence that the eliminat :i. on of Communist-
controlled unions was not the primary objective of Reuther 
me_y be observed in the controversy between the Farm Equipment 
Workers Union (FE) and Reuther. - Reuther opp osed the prop osed 
mer g er of the FE union with the UAW in 1946 on the grounds 
tha t the FE wa s Communist-con trolled. At this time, Reuther 
was seek ing the presidency of the UAW and he was not supp orted 
b y t he FE . However, after his election, et the 1949 conven-
t i on of the CIO , Reuther demanded that the FE , which wa s one 
of t he ten uni ons considered to be Communist-controlled , me r g e 
wi t h the UAW, thus adding t o the size and power of t h e UAw .23 
Reu ther's failure to r eturn the unions th a t the U/&.W had raid e d 
f rom the UE to t h e non-Communist CIO-chartered, I UE union, i n-
dic e.ted that Reuther's interest in eliminating Communist-con-
23 Philip Selznick, The Or ganization al We apon, p p. 
2 3L~ ff. 
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trolled unions from the CIO may have been primarily for pur-
poses of the control of the CIO by Reuther and the ri ght-wing 
faction. Reuther's failure to purg e the UAW Ford Local 600 
of Commu nist control until the year 1952, when -a public he ar-
ing by the Un-Arnerican Committee dlsclosed that the local was 
Communist-controlled, 24 may be an indication that conformance 
with Reuther's policies had priority over the remov a l of 
Communist leaders in the UAW . Reuther ' s declara t ion a t the 
19)~-9 CIO convention, that he had no objections to Communists 
being in the CIO, but that he h ad objection to them being 
lea.ders of CIO unions, pointed out that it was not the 
Communist threat to the n a tion which was of prime importance 
to Reuther, but that his ma.in objective mey have been to 
make ineffective any opposition to his power and policies. 
In all of his activities, Reuther used the ideologi cal 
issue of Communism as a justifiable re a son for his actions . 
Jls noted elsewhere, the FE and the UE were the first CIO 
affiliates to have their charters revoked. ~~y were Reu ther' s 
mai n attacks directed against the FE and the TTE ? The answer 
to this question may be found in the rel a tionship as it ex-
i s t ed on the or ganizational level between the FE , TJE and UAV'l . 
The expulsion of the two unions indicated Reuther's power and 
leadershi p over the right-wing faction in the CIO. However, 
24 The Boston Globe , Ma.rch 12, 1952. 
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the expulsions ma.y have occurred because raiding , secessions, 
ideological charges, and ri ght-wing or ganizational efficiency 
failed to affect the left-wing unions' stetus and organization-
al advances. 
The reason that the left-wing unions were not affected 
by the attecks to the point of disintegration may be that the 
membership of the se unions did not consider tha.t the ideologi -
cal char ges leveled against them gave the right-wing faction 
the l i cense to raid their unions. The orga.nizetional efficien-
cy of the left-wing leaders apparently satisfied the majority 
of the members in these unions. The organizational efficiency 
of the left-wing unions may have caused the ri ght-win g fection 
to resort to expulsions as a means to protect its own st atu s 
in the CI O, as well as in its own unions. 
Phili p Murray st ated that the dissention in the CIO 
began in 1946. This was the year that Reuther involved the 
CIO , particulerly the UE , in costly strikes. Reuther's 
seizure of the initiative at that time may have caused re-
sentment against Reuther on the part of the UE leaders. As 
long es Reuther was president of the Genel:'al Motors Division 
of the UPJ.W , there were no raids conducted against the UE . 
The fact that Reuther became president of the UAW by intro-
ducing the ideological issue of Communism into his campai gn, 
made the campai gn a political issue instead of a contest be -
t ween two leadel:'s on issues of or ganizational competence. 
The UE leaders may have resented this also. 
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Reuther's competence as a negotietor was challenged by 
the l eft -wing unions, notably the UE : 
In 1947, the General Motors Corporation succeeded in 
si gning an agreement with the UE while it was still ne go-
tiating with the UAW ••• whereupon the UAW signed up for 
the same wage increases. 25 
According to Reyn olds, this action broke the united labor 
front. This action on the part of the UE , indicated that 
the UE challenged the supremacy of the U.AW in the Gener al 
Motors plants. The action of the UE was a defeat for Reuther 
and damaging to his position as the newly-elected president 
of the UA.W . His plura_li ty in the election had only been 124 
votes over Thomas. It is a well knovm fact that in the field 
of organized labor: 
Gains or even demands in one sector of the AFL or the 
CIO tend to repeat themselves elsewhere. It must be re-
membered that the labor movement is intensely political. 
If non-Communist leaders do not gain as much l:l S their 
opponents, they may soon find themselves with an active 
Communist opposition in their own union. 26 
Reuther may have expanded his anti-Communist campaign against 
CIO affiliates, especially the UE , in an attempt to overcome 
ga ins made by the UE . Reuther had to be aggressive to re-
tain control of the UAW and prevent the left-wing represents-
tives on the UAW Executive Board from sabota ging his policies 
and position in the UA.W . 27 
25 Lloyd G. Reynolds, Le.bor Economics and Labor Rela-
tions, p. 177• ---
26 Communists Within the Labor Movement, United States 
Chamber of Commerce publication, 1947, p. 6. 
27 Loc. cit. 
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In addition to the internal situation, Reuther had to 
offset the effects of the post war decline in employment. 
Whi le the CI O unions generally declined in membership, the 
UE , in spite of layoffs during 1947 and 1948, reported their 
memb ership to be six percent above the previous year's record 
membership. The UE also reported continued progress in their 
contract provisions. 28 
During the 1947-1948 wage contract ne gotiations, which 
included the second round of wage increases since the end of 
Wor ld vifar Two, the UE attempted to unite with the TJA1N in t he 
demand for wage increases in the General Motors plants. How-
ever, "' the U.PJ.W leadership broke with the past history of the 
union; instead of uniting with other workers to secure wage 
increases, it cooperated with employers to raid unions." 29 
Thereupon, the UE undertook the wage campai gn alone end after 
a considerable amount of delaying Bction, tt on ~rf ay 25 , 1948 , 
the no-wage increase conspiracy wa.s broken, when Ge ner a l 
Motors agreed to settle. n 30 
Once more the workers were afforded the opportunity of 
comparing the organizational efficiency of the UE leadership 
with that of the UAW . The UE leaders maintained that: 
The United Auto Workers and several other CIO int er-
national unions developed a campai gn aga.inst the UE ••• 
The disrupters within the UE worked hand-in-glove with 
28 UE -CIO Report of GenerF.l Officers, 1948, pp. 19 ff. 
29 Ibid. , p. 22. 
30 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the TJ.!A.W leedership •••• National representatives of the CIO 
participated in meetings with the TJAW le adership , and 
other unions, where raids on the UE were being plotted . 31 
In spite of the raids and other activities against the 
UE , it continued to gain in memberships. For t be ye e.r 1948-49 , 
the UE showed a ge.in of 61,102 workers and it won recognition 
in 128 plants. The UJ.&W showed a gain of 40,000 workers and 
it won recognition in 102 plants . 32 Gains of the TTE bee arne 
losses for the U/!W . Furthermore, the largest CIO affiliate, 
the Steel and Automotive Workers, we.s nearly expanded to its 
limits, while the electrical industr y was still expanding. 
Thus, there existed the possibility that the UE could pro-
gress to the point where it might become the s e cond lar gest 
or possibly the largest of the CIO affiliBted unions. It is 
possible that the expulsions of the FE and the UE from the 
CIO by the ri ght-win g faction were promoted as a prevents-
tive measure to curb the continued growth of these unions. 
Apparently, the use of ideological issues against the 
UE for purposes of raiding was not es successful as antici-
pated . This may indicate that the membership at lar ge did 
not sanction the raids, based on ideological gr ounds, end 
t ha t the members of the unions jud ged their leaders on their 
or ganize_tional accomplishments. That the anti -Communist 
campaign did not reach anticipated expectations may be ob-
31 Ibid., p ~ ~.8 . 
32 CIO Convention Proceedings, 1949, op. cit., 
pp . 83 ff . 
served in a question asked by the United St at es Ch8mber of 
Commerce five yeers after its 1946-47 campai gn. 
Why do wor kers v ote for Communist unions? It is 
felt that at the present time, everyone should be aware 
whi ch unions ar e Red •••• Why then, are ( Red) le aders 
often voted in by huge ma jor i ties? The answer to the 
above question must be complex. One i mp ortant point 
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is t e chni cal competenc e of some Communist union le aders ••• 
It often happens th a t individual Communist le ade rs are 
aggr essive and skillful. In the l enguege of the worker, 
they deliver the goods. They are militant fi ghters for 
labor's clHi ms •••• I t is often difficult to convince 
workers that their le aders are actua l l y Co~munists or 
their tools . The union members suspect other unions of 
being interested primarily in raiding . 33 
If this statement issued by an an ti-union, anti-
Conw.uni st as socia ti on is true, then the TIE leaders may have 
demonstrated a gre Bter degree of organization a l efficienc y 
than the U W le 8ders. This mfly have ..f:Or.eed Reuther to use 
the ideologic al issue of Communism rather than or gan izational 
eff i ciency in the competitive struggle. Fa.iling in obtaining 
his desired obj ect ives, it appeer s possib l e tho.t Reuther 
attempted to accomplish in the CIO orgAnization , what he 
fa i l ed to eccomp lish in the compe titive strugg le between the 
leaders of the unions. This may explain why the FE and the 
UE , the two unions, which were Reu ther's competitors, were 
the first to be expelled from the CIO . I n the power strugg le 
between two factions within the CIO, t h e anti-Communist fac-
tion was in the ma jorit y . 
33 Communism, Wh:ere Do We Stand Tod 2y , United States 
Chamber of Commerce publicetiorl'; 1952. 
Since the UE leaders could not be accused of mal-ad-
ministering the UE, the only other point on which the UE 
leaders could be attacked was on the political activities of 
the UE leadership. In this, Reuther and the right-wing 
faction were aided by the anti-Communist campaigns waged by 
a number of public opinion groups, some of which directly 
accused the CIO of harboring Communist-controlled unions 
within its organization. Reuther and the righb-wing faction 
accepted and endorsed the Truman Administration's policies. 
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The UE leaders opposed some of the endorsements made by the 
right-wing faction. This action on the part of the UE leaders, 
at this particular time, may be an indication that they 
wished to create a situation, which would result in a show 
of strength to determine which faction was to gain control 
of the CIO Executive Board. The 1948 and 1949 UE conventions 
approved the UE leaders' resolutions to act against the 
activities of the CIO Executive Board. 
If the UE leaders with the support of the left-wing 
faction had hoped to win control of the GIO, their hope was 
dashed at the 1949 convention. Out-voted at the pre-convention 
Executive Board meeting and at the convention, with no oppor-
tunity for redress of their grievances against raiding, the 
UE leaders may have permitted the situation to deteriorate 
and thus may have permitted the UE's expulsion. This may 
account for the absence of the UE delegates at the convention. 
In the struggle for power in the CIO, that Communism 
ma ·y no t have been the problem and thBt t he Conununist issue 
was used as a means , wa s further emphasi zed in a published 
letter, dated March 21, 1952 . The l ett er was written by L . 
R . Boulware, public relations m~nager of General Electric 
Compsny ( GE ), and sent to the Senate .Sub-Committee on Labor 
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a nd Labor Mane geme nt Relations. Excerpt s of this letter are 
presented for purposes of c ompari son. The importance of t h is 
letter lies in the fact that the GE WB.s the l e. rgest emp loyer 
with wh om the ~JE had labor contracts. Thus, the GE , as an 
employer , was in a position to directly ob s erve the be -
havior of the UE , and other unions of the CIO. The GE has 
not been accused of being Communist - controlled, or of being 
an org anization with a favorable bias toward 18bor unions . 
In the Government-Labor Union controversy , the GE was the 
third party affected by both Governmen t and Labor Union 
regulations and demB nds. What follows is in pert what the 
GE Labor-Man agement directorate discover ed in its dey to 
da y relations with the UE , conce rning the Communist issue 
in the UE and the CI O. In the letter, 34 the GE points out 
the confusion which exists around the Communist accusations 
and the lack of evidence for the accusati on s . In order to 
be ab l e to take legal or authoritative action again s t a labor 
34 Whe.t To Do Abou t Communism in Unions , General 
Electri c pU5Tfc ati on, I•II a.rch 1952. 
union on g~ounds of co~~unist control, there must be p~oof 
showing the union to be a Communist f~ont or ganization pri-
marily working in the interest of a forei gn Communist power 
or Co:rnmunis·t party. 35 The letter states in part that : 
As early as 1939 testimony wa s given before e Con-
gr essional Committee conc e rning infiltration end control 
of unions by Communists . S ome of the same unions we~e 
expelled from the CIO only i n 1949 • ••• Those who warned 
against the Communist dange~ in 19 39 were called Re d 
baiters by those in power including ma ny who are now 
promlnent anti - Corn .. munist B.nd 1tri ght-win g 1 leaders •• •• 
For example, there is testimony under oa th, before the 
House Un-tlllerican Committ;ee in October 1 33 9 thst ·Mr . 
James B. Carey, Secretary of the CIO and now President 
of the rtJE -CIO, who is quite vocally op posed to 
Communism and Communists, W8 S a member of the Communist 
"Party . (Hearings before the Special Committee on Un-
P.tnerlcan Activities( H. R . 76 Cong . 1st Session Vol. 9 , 
pp . 5760-5794 ( 19 39 J • • •• Furthermore, prominent non-
Communist leaders refused to si gn the non-Communist 
a.ffidavit of the T. H. bill •• • while the expelled unions, 
whose officers sig ned the non-Communi st affidavits h eve 
continued to enjoy the full protection of Federal law •••• 
The Atomi c Ener gy Commission ' s request (in 1949) that the 
GE withdrew recognition from the UE -CIO brough t la.w su its 
and protests from the UE e.nd the CIO •• • yet later that 
same year the CIO itself expelled the UE from any fur-
ther representation or membership in the CIO •• • which 
leads us to feel that unions are likely to be influ-
enced by the political or emotional fe.ctors bearing on 
their immediate interests at a given moment. 
The motivation for action a g ainst Communist unions by 
Congress is a fear of strikes for Rpolitical~ .purposes 
during an emergency. In practice, certainly .in the pre-
sent defense period, the various rtanti-Comrnun i st'·• or 
' ~ ri ght-wing'~ unions are at least neck-a.nd-neck with any 
'·~ left-wing ' ~ unions - publicly suspected of subversive 
tendencies or dan gers - in their threatened or actua l 
interruption of critical defense production in our own 
(GE) atomic, electronics and aircraft plants • • • 
3 5 Ibid • , p • 17 • 
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Our day to day negotiations hP.ve not provided us with 
any conclusive evidence that one or more of these unions 
were in actual fact under Communist domination. I n cer-
tain anti-Commu nist unions, we so often find ourselves 
dealing with substantially the s~~e leaders in a new role 
who only yesterday and for years past were in the camp 
they now denounce •••• However, as we read the CIO 1949 
convent ion record, it seems to us th a t the organizations 
were expelled not because they were found to constitute 
a d anger or threat to the country, but chiefly bece.use 
they had refused to follow the political and other poli-
cies which had been adopted and endorsed by the CIO. 
The record aooeer s to indicate that the CIO was not ob-
jecting to th~ rights of ncommunists'' to function as la -
bor leaders, their objections were against these men as 
leaders of CI 0 un i ons. 
Obviously what the country is interested in is not 
the particular politics of the moment as between fac-
tions in unions, or as between competing unions, but in 
the prompt exposure and elimination of C~rununists from 
positions in which they can injure the countr y ••• • 1J1le 
yield to no one in our hatred of Communism. However, 
likewise we yield to no one in our desire to pr ot ect 
innocent individuals from false accusations and injury. 
The problem of protecting minorities or unpopular groups 
is always present in s ny re gu latory le gislation and may 
be an even more serious problem in this area where un-
adorned struggles for power exist, both within the 
unions and between riv al unions. We know that feelings 
run high, and the strategy and tactics ere often rough 
and unrestrained. Legislation must not be based on re-
mote and speculative dangers which might result to a 
particular organization or in shifts in the co~petitive 
advantages enjoyed by v arious union leaders. 3 
The statements above by the GE Labor Relations manager 
indicate tha t the GE did not find the UE the Communist threat 
it was purported to be according to Reuther, Carey, Tobin , 
and the anti-union e.nd anti-Communist associations. The fact 
that the UE is operating a labor union today appears to indi-
cate that the UE leaders were directing their activities 
36 Ibid., pp. 1 ff. 
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towa N] objectives of obtaining bargaining contracts on the 
b e st pos sible terms for their members. The conten ts of the 
GE letter point out the confusion and lack of clear delinea-
tion, concerning who are Communis ts and what constitutes a 
Communist-led union. The letter also explains why the Commu-
nist cha r ges and the issues involved were not brought before 
the leg al authorities for dis p osition. The letter also ex-
plains why the UE was not denied the le gitimacy to present 
itself as a labor union. 
The facts presented in the foregoin g pages indicate 
the inadequacy of the evidence upon which the char g es were 
made ag ainst the left-wing unions, particularly the UE . 
Those who presented the ideological issue reached object·ves, 
whi ch were primarily objectives of self-interest. Therefore, 
it appears that those who were engag ed in strugg les for power 
used the ideological issue rather then organizational effi-
ciency as a means to obtain desired g oals . 
CHAPTER V 
GEfffiRA1 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of the paper was that under certain con-
ditions, when there is a critical, ideological conflict in a 
society; groups, sub-groups, and individuals, who are engaged 
in struggles for power, may use ideological issues as criteria 
rather than organizational efficiency in their attempts to 
reach certain objectives. 
In chapter II it was shown that ideologies were com-
posed of valuational judgments, which influenced the beliefs 
and behavior of individuals in their social relationships. 
It was noted that a "public" was a leaderless group, facing 
an issue upon which it had to act. The presentation of an 
ideological issue to a "public" tended to produce confusion 
over conflicting loyalties. Agitators furnished solutions 
intended to change public opinion in the direction desired by 
the agitators. Ideological issues presented to a npublic" 
within an organized group tended to produce factionalism 
within the group. The effects which resulted from the use of 
ideological issues made it difficult to determine whether or 
not their use were manifest or latent functions. 
The empirical data pointed out that the introduction 
of an ideological issue to a "public" enabled the various 
individuals and groups, who presented the issue, to reach 
certain objectives of self-interest. 
So 
The Chamber of Commerce of the United S tates (Cha~ber) 
i n 1946 and 19L~i, introduced the problem of the existence of 
Commu nism in the nation, the Democra.tic Administration, and 
the C ongr es s of Ind u strial Or gani zati on ( CI 0) • After the 
presentation of the issue, the Republican Party was victor-
ious in the 1946 elections. The Democratic ·Party, the 
Democratic P arty-CIO coalition, and the CIO were weakened. 
& number of restrictive lab or laws, which were part of the 
Chamber's or ga.nizational objectives, wel'e enacted into law. 
Lat e r the CIO was ft~ther weakened by the expulsion of some 
of i ts un i ons. 
The Catholic Church presented the problem of world 
Commu nism and of the danger of Comnunists controlling labor 
unions. The ob jective of the Church was to prevent the 
Commu nist control of labor unions, so th a t unions could not 
be instrumen ts for attack upon the Church organization. To 
protect itself, the Chu:rch, through the Associe.tion of 
Catholic Trade Unionists, trained union members fo:r posi-
tions of leadership within the unions. 
The empirical de.te pointed out that Walte:r Reuther 
and the r i ght-wing faction within the CIO made extensive 
use of the ideologi cal issue . The f act tha t the CI O was 
s plit into two f a c t ions showed the existence of a n·public n 
within the CIO and the effect, which ideologi cal issues 
hHve on such a group . 
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Some of the facto~s which may have caused le aders of 
the ~i ght-wing faction to use the ideological issue we~e , (1) 
a situation of ideological conflict existed in the society as 
a whole, (2) the ideologice.l issues were adaptable fo~ use as 
a means fo~ obtaining objectives of self-inte~est, (3) ~i ght­
wing le Bd e~s were unable to oust the leadership of the left-
win g unions, (L~) ri ght-wing le ade~s we~e unable to compete 
with left-wing le ade~ s on the level whe~e o~ ganizational 
efficiency was of gre a ter impo~tance then the ideologi cal 
issues, (5) left-wing unions continued to increp.se their 
membe~ship and powe~, and ( 6) union membe~s disapproved of 
the ~ight-wing faction's illegal activities of ~aiding . 
S ome of the activities fo~ which the ideologic a l issue 
was used in the CIO we~e , (1) Walte~ Reuther 's campai gn fo~ 
the presidency of the United Automobile Workers of Ame~ica 
(UAVif ), (2) justification fo~ raids upon the r nited Elect~ical, 
Radio end Machine Workers (UE ) and other unions within the 
CIO by the UAW and the United S teel Workers of Ame~ica and 
othe~ ~t ght-wing unions, ( 3) secession movements within the 
left-wing unions by ~i ght-wing mino~ities, and (4) expul-
sion of the UE and seve~al othe~ left-wing unions f~om the 
CIO. 
S ome of the ~esults of the use of the ideological 
issue were , (1) factionalism and division within the CIO , 
(2) consolidation of power 8nd oont~ol of the unions by 
right-wing leaders, (3) elimination of organizational com-
petition between left-wing and right-wing leaders, (4) con-
solidation of power and control of the CIO by the right-wing 
faction, and (5) conformity to pressure from organizations, 
external to the CIO, thereby, establishing the CIO as an in-
group. 
A series of facts pointed out that the Communist issue 
may have been used as a means in a power struggle between the 
leaders. The left-wing group was a small minority in the CIO 
and right-wing policies were -- the official policies carried 
out b1J the CIO. Therefore, the expulsions app~ared to be 
unnecessary. No conclusive legal evidence was presented by 
the right-wing faction which indicated subversive activities 
on the part of the left-wing faction. The action was between 
two factions of labor leaders. Right-wing leaders did not 
return raided unions to the CIO-chattered, non-Communist unions. 
Communist controlled unions were ordered to merge with right-
wing unions. Communist-controlled locals were permitted to 
operate within right-wing unions. After the expulsions former 
left-wing leaders changed over to the right-wing and con-
tinued to function in the same capacities. 
The dissent, registered by the UE, was against the 
raiding and dictation of the right-wing fection in the cro . 
The UE failed to obtain redress from the CIO on its complaints 
- ' 
concerning the raiding, secession, and interference with its 
auton omy. The action of dissent on the part of the UE appears 
to heve been a measure aimed at preserving the or ganizational 
identity of the UE . It does not appear to have been an action 
directed by the Soviet Union . The facts presented appeer to 
give evidence in support of the theoretical hypothesis, that 
under certain conditions, ideological issues rather th an or-
ganizational efficiency may be used by those participating 
in strugg les for power . 
From the material presented it must not be assumed that the 
left-wing faction avoided using ideological issues to reach t heir 
obj ectives , because ideologiual issues generally play importa nt 
rolesin all power struggles. For example the UE's opposition to 
the CIO policies were on ideologica l grounds . It was not t he 
intent to show, inthis paper, that the ideological issue was t he 
single factor determinant . It was the inteil.y to show tha t the 
i d.e ological issue was an i mportB.nt factor in changing the order 
of relationship between the leaders of t he CIO. The right-wing 
faction's activity was chosen as subject matter becau s e t hey 
successfully used the ideological issue. This hypothe s is may 
be applicable to power . s t.:r.uggles in other organiza tions and 
i s therefore of broader relevance than merely for the present 
problem. 
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ln recent times , i deological i ssues#a- ising out o:r 
t he problems. presented by CornnrtH'li.Sr.a, ha.vo come to pl ay t.: n 
critical i deologica l eonf'l icts t'tithin a sociaty ~ ·:;r oups 1 
. sub- ,) .. oups, and indiv~.duf.lls ; \til o !ir'e on .~ap ed i n stt·u r: l es 
f:tr.c power t end t o tts~ it:he e:xt.rS. P~ous ideol or:ical i <:>sues 
r a.t.her tha r?. or .:aniztiona l efficienc.v as tt nea.ns t o r ea ch 
their obj~ct :tves, 
In tha United States, thq publio t1as inf orme d by 
anti ... co~unist and ant i•union as.so.oiat, .:ons t hat some gove r n-
mental de pa;rtments and a number of affiliat es of t he Con ,re.ss 
of. I ndustr ial Orgf.tniza.tions (CIO.) t1~~e e i t he r cornmunist ... con-
trolled or under Conununist influence~ .ttmong the unions 
accuS,ed t11a.a the United Eleetr iealt Radio a.nd l\i1a .¢h l.ne ~:Jorkers 
(UE) • 
In 1949 , tha UI~ and SEjife:ral othe :t* l eft-.·win ,· a ffiliates 
ue·. e 0~pelled from t he u! O. The expulsions came l'lS a cliw..ax 
to a struecl~ tor pot<rer bet,·re em t he l.eadel"'S ·t>f 'trh~ :rig ·t ... uing 
and le·ft•\>~ipg factions in the CIO . The rip.:htw.\dnr. f . et ion 
u sed t _ e issue o.:f: Comtnunism a s a maans f 'or gaining t he support 
o£ t he mornher s in t he c:ro u.nion·s, rather than rel..yinc-:, on 
their ~i'ficiency as organiz.ors and labor leade:t"'S. 
Ideolo '>ieal issuus are eff ecti"'TO as po'i,;rer 1-rea.pons .. 
I deological i .ssues a r e cqmposed . of Yaluati onal judc:mcnts, 
t'fhi ch ini'lueenccs the bolf~fs and behavior of individuals 
,, -_ 
in the i r social relationships . The · i ntrlbduct l on of ideol-
g ical i sues t o a ~'publfc rr uithi n an OJ."'ganiz(?d ,,:·ro -:. p t .. ~qed 
t o produce fa.ctionalisro tJit~hin the p.:1:-oup . 
'1\·.ro organizations , the Chamber of ('lommer co of t.he 
-
United States and the Cat 10lic . Ghur -1'~ ,, were en ,~R;.ed :i:.n a 
pOimar et rug -le 'tdth the CIO and t he D~mocr:atic Pa;r>ty~ e 
Chambe: , in 1946 and 1947t· !ntroruoed th-e problem of ~ornmunism 
in the nation- the Democrat ic Administ:rat~i.on and t he CIO. 
After thG presentation of t he issue • . tha Republican Party 
·ms victorious in the 1946 el~ction$~ The Democl!"atic Party . 
th'G Democratic Party ... ciO coal.it1.on1 a nd the GJO 1.·1er e tileakened . 
_A number of restrictive labor la't'rS ,. "hi¢h t-te r e part of t 1.e 
Chamber.' .s Ol\ _,anizational ob j eetive$ vtere enact ed :tnt o la ' • 
later, t he CIO _.1aa further "'reakened by the expulsion of some 
of i t s: unions •. 
1he Catholic Church presented the problem 0.11. HO:rld 
comr.lttni 's·m and o:r the dange1? of ;ornnmniats controlling labor 
unions • rille ob,j:e·ot ive o£ t he Church \'1a.S to prevent the 
1"omrm.miet cont rol of labor unions, ao that~ uniona ~ie;ht 
not become instt~uments for att ack upon the church organi-
zation. Tb protect itself• the Chureh. through the Associati on 
of' Catholic Tr~de Unionis.ts trained union rnembe:rs i'or 
positions of leadersh.i . t·Jithin t he unions. 
'Ihe empil•icnl data pe>inted out that the intr oduction 
of nn ideological issue ena led the various groups; t.rh ieh pre ... 
2 
3 
sented the issue, to re aoh certain objectives ot s elt·interest. 
The empirical data pointed out thst alter Beu t.her end the 
l'1gh -t•w1ng .t'ao tion in the CIO made extensive uae of the ideo-
logical 1aauth 
Slome of the l ectors, which m y h eve c aused l eader a or 
the ri ght .. wing .t'ect1 on to use the ideological ·iaaue were, ( 1) 
a situation of ideological conflict existed 1n the aoo1ety aa 
a whole, (2) the i"eologioal la$uea were adaptable tor uae as 
a me ens o.t' powel' .t'ol' obtaining objeoti ves of . ae lt-intereat, 
(3) r1 ght•w1ng leeders were uneble to oompetewitb lett-wing 
leaders on the level where org~m1sat1onal efttciency ••• of 
greater import•noe then the 1deolog1o.al 1aauea, 1md ( 4 ) l et t• 
wing unions continued to increase the1l' membership and power. 
The aot1v1 tie:a for which the ideological iasue w-e• . 
used in the CIO were, (1) alter Reuther's campai gn tor the 
presidency ot the United Automobile Workers of ftmerioa (lJ W), 
(2) j ust1t1oation tor !'aida u p on. the UE and othel' lett-wing 
affiliates by the UAW and other r1 ght•w1ng unions, ( 3) se-
cession movements within the l ett-wing unions by 1'ight-w1ng 
minol'1t1es, and <4l expulsion of the UE and sever 1 other 
lett-wing unions from the cro. 
The uae ot the 1deologiosl 1saue reaulted in, (1) 
tsotionaliam and d1v1s1on within the CI O, (2) aonaol1dat1on 
of' power and control ot the uniona and _the CI O by l'i ght-w1ng 
leaders, and (3) conformity to preaaure tram organizations, 
external to the CI O, thereby, establiahing the CI O as an 1n-
group. 
4 
A aeries of facta pointed out that the Communist issue 
'· 
m1.1y heve been used as a means in e power struggle between 
le eders. The lett .. w1ng gl"oup wea o: smell .m1nol'1 ty in the CIO 
and ri ght-wing polici e s were the ott1c1 el policies cal"ried out 
by the CIO. Therefore, the expula1ona appeared to be unnecessary. 
·No ·· legal. . vidence of aubvers1 ve act1 vi ty wee pl'eaented by the 
rlght•wtng group. The entire aotlon in the OI O was between a 
group ot labor leaders. Neither the lett•w1ng unions nor 
thei:r l e,;dera 1 were de nied the 1eg1 timacy to continue tunc .. 
tion1ng . Power and control sppeared to be the objective or 
the r1 ght•w1ng leedel'S because l'aided unions wer·e not re• 
turned to OIO•chertered, non ... conununtat uniona<t The l'i ght-
w1ng C!O leaders ordered Conunun11t ... controlled unions to merge 
with ri ght ... wing unions. Com.muniat•oontrolled locale were per-
mitted to function within right-wing unions. Some alleged 
Communist leaders were not expelled, but dtapleced, P.nd con-
tinued in ott1ce in the OIO in othel' oapao1t1es. Others 
continued ae membel"s. After the expulsions, some lett•w1ng 
leeders became ri ght•wlng leedera end continued· in their 
former cepaolty under a new label. 
The diseent, :registered by the UE , was •s ~lnat the 
raiding E!nd dictation or the l'ight•wing taction in the CIO. 
The UE tailed to obtain l'edresa tram. the 0! 0 on its oom• 
plaints, concerning the raiding , secession, and intertel'enoe 
wl th 1 ts autonomy, The set ion ot dissent on the part of the 
UE appeared to have been e measure aimed at .preserving the 
5 
organiza.tional iden~i ty of the TJE. It does not · sppea:r to 
have been an action directed by the Soviet Union. The facts 
presented appe ·~r to give evidence in support .of the theoreti-
c 1 hypothesis, that under certain conditions,. ideological 
issues rather then orgsnlzatlonal efficiency may be used by 
those participating 1n struggles. for power. 
